访越忆想：改革开放的苦难 越南在重复中国的故事 袁钢明
越南金融危机的消息铺天盖地。股市房价暴跌、汇率贬值，通货膨胀、居民抢购外汇黄金、贸易逆差、外资抽逃、国际评级下降等等。记者采访很多。两周前的6月10日，第一个采访的新华社内参记者，问如何看待越南金融危机，是否会引发东南亚式的大规模金融危机，对中国有何影响和警示。我的第一反应，越南不可能发生东南亚那样的金融危机。几年前我去过越南，有第一手观察直感。我看到，越南正在跟着中国后头学习改革开放。我回答说，越南现在发生的这些事情，中国也发生过，越南当前不是金融危机，而是严重通货膨胀。记者对我的回答感到意外，说我的说法和已采访过的其他人的说法不一样。以后几天，经过仔细研究，我认定我最初的回答是正确的。
四年前，我随中国社会科学院哲学所代表团访问越南。越南社会科学院希望我们介绍中国改革开放的理论和做法。在胡志明市，我们参加了越南社会科学院主办的“越南与中国所有制改革与开放经验”学术研讨会。应越方要求，我们介绍了马克思所有制理论在中国改革开放实践中的发展、中国非公有制经济发展、中国国有企业改革等情况。我做了中国所有制改革进展的报告。越南社会科学院学者的学术报告，主要谈马克思的所有制、资本等理论概念如何应用于越南改革开放实践等问题。越南社科院学者的学术报告令我吃惊。我没有想到，他们那样专注地解释马克思的资本概念如何适用于社会主义经济，那样费劲地进行着马克思原始概念的转换工作。他们正在重复我们二、三十年前做过的事。
在学术交流中，我们和来自越南北方河内市的学者一见如故。他们现在使用的学术语言和考证方法竟然和我们过去的语境和做法一模一样。我感到，越南改革开放的理论研究大体上相当于中国八十年代。我们代表团里的何成轩老师是越南问题专家，他告诉我，胡志明市和河内市不一样。从河内来的越南社会科学院学者的发言可以看到传统马克思主义在越南官方的正统地位，而胡志明市到处飘荡资本主义市场经济的浓重气息。越南从1979年开始经济改革，和中国几乎同时起步。1986年越南提出实行社会主义商品经济，比中国提出社会主义商品经济略晚两年。此后，越南改革理论落后于中国的距离明显拉大。2001年越南正是提出实行社会主义定向的市场经济，比中国1992年提出建立社会主义市场经济晚了九年。越南的经济改革和中国一样，要将原来的中央计划经济转变为社会主义市场经济。越南与中国相比，改革过程中遇到的理论障碍较大。直到现在，理论界和政府部门还困扰于私营经济是否剥削、私人业主是否可以成为越共党员等意识形态难题。胡志明市是越南改革中的一块特殊土地。胡志明市前身西贡市受法国殖民地经济影响，资本主义经济发展水平相对较高，胡志明市的经济改革与越南北方等其他地区不一样，不是在计划经济中引入市场经济，而是在原有的资本主义经济土壤里植入社会主义市场经济成分。当越南北方等大部分地区的市场化改革受阻于理论障碍的时候，胡志明市早已是私营经济及市场经济的天下。
我们入住的宾馆位于市中心统一宫广场近旁。越南战争期间诸多震惊世界的事件发生在这里。宫廷暗杀、僧人自焚、学生示威、军警镇压，战争结束时美国大使馆屋顶上载运败逃人员的直升机盘旋起落。晚上散步，过去新闻纪录片里风云翻卷的地方就在眼前。白天会议厅里庄严肃穆的越南共产党党旗和胡志明塑像，马克思主义学者的身姿和神情，久久萦绕在我的脑际。越南人民与美国强敌浴血奋战，取得史诗般的伟大胜利。胡志明和越南共产党在南北统一的越南人民中享有无可争议的威望。奇怪的是，越南书店里竟然找不到一本抗美战争的图书。在河内机场转机的一段时间里，我在机场书店里好不容易找到一本厚厚的英文版越南历史书，想浏览一下抗美战争期间的内容，不料书中这一部分被包封起来，不准翻阅。后来，我才知道越南为了改善与美国关系，吸引美国投资，公开场所所有越南抗美战争的图文资料都被撤了下来。机场一些地方摆放着吸引外商投资的宣传品，随手可取。抗美战争的胜利和伟人的光芒，给越南人民带来了荣耀和尊严，也给越南市场化方向的改革开放带来难以解开的矛盾和困惑。胡志明没有给越南人民留下发展市场经济的先知预言，当今越南的经济改革在面对市场化改革深层阻碍时常常不知所措。越南理论界在私营经济发展问题上混战不休，停步不前。据说胡志明说过私营业主属于剥削阶级，学者的相反说法会被视为异端。胡志明市私营经济胜过国有经济的改革发展模式遭受过批判。过去的西贡市，现在的胡志明市，五光十色，到处是欧式建筑。白皙皮肤、高挑身材的漂亮姑娘飘然走过。据说美国大兵留下的混血少女给这座城市带来了迷人的魅力。胡志明市这座奇异的城市，色彩斑斓，令人眩目。
在胡志明市的宾馆和商店付款，服务员喜欢收美元，找给越南盾。越南盾的票面数值很大，兑美元汇率低得惊人。1万多越南盾只等于1美元。越南盾汇率这样低，很大程度上是通货膨胀不断恶化造成的。我在越南北方的芒街边贸市场上听说过通货膨胀致使货币剧烈贬值的悲惨故事。有华侨在越南辛辛苦苦积攒了几麻袋越南盾藏在床底下，十几年前价值上百万元人民币，近年贬到了只值几万元人民币。1986年越南价格和货币改革之前，200越南盾兑换1美元，价格改革之后变为3700越南盾兑换1美元。价格和汇率管制全面撤除，一步到位地实现了从管制价格和管制汇率向市场价格和市场汇率的转换。价格改革和汇率改革后，绵延不断的通货膨胀和强劲高涨不落的外汇需求造成越南盾不断贬值。现在汇率已经贬到了16000以上越南盾兑换1美元。现在的越南盾汇率和1986年汇率改革前的汇率相比下降了差不多99%。越南尚未实行货币自由兑换，居民不能到银行自由兑换外币。越南海外侨民数量庞大，侨民汇入外币较多。国内半白半黑的灰色兑换无处不有。胡志明市金银首饰金店和一些大百货店设有货币兑换摊点。这些货币兑换点好像不合法，却可大摇大摆地摆在那里。胡志明市的商店和芒街的边贸市场一样，既收越南盾，也收美元和人民币，汇率围绕市场流行汇率讨价还价。越南盾的市场汇率略低于官方汇率。市场汇率实际上在越南盾的汇率变动上起着更为重要的作用。越南盾的市场汇率接近官方汇率，居民可以在市场上自由兑换外币，基本上实现了居民小额外汇的自由兑换。越南的通货膨胀持续不息，居民为避免通货膨胀损失始终不断地用本币兑换美元，造成越南盾兑美元汇率不断贬值。现在通货膨胀率上升到25%以上，越南盾贬值的恐慌心理和兑换美元的市场压力增大，推动越南盾加速贬值
中国也出现过通货膨胀导致本币急剧贬值的类似现象。上世纪八十年代中后期和九十年代上半期中国通货膨胀严重，很多人希望用人民币兑换美元。人民币不能自由兑换。黑市兑换受到严格禁止，这是中国和越南的不同之处。居民在银行外的外币兑换交易被视为违法。企业可在严格管理的外汇调剂市场上兑换外币。当通货膨胀快速上升的时候，人们用人民币兑换美元大量增多，外汇调剂市场和外汇黑市中的人民币兑美元汇率比官方汇率更大幅度下降。1994年通货膨胀升高到24.1%，人民币官方汇率从上年5.7元人民币兑1美元下降到8.6元人民币兑1美元，贬值30% 多，外汇黑市交易异常活跃，外汇调剂市场和外汇黑市的人民币汇率下降到10元至15元左右人民币兑1美元，比官方汇率多贬值10%-40%。中国曾经发生过的通货膨胀型货币贬值比现在越南通货膨胀型货币贬值更加严重，中国并没有发生金融危机。宏观调控很快将通货膨胀控制下去，外汇黑市交易随之减少，外汇调剂市场和外汇黑市人民币汇率逐渐回升到官方汇率的水平，人民币汇率从此由不断下降转变为持续上升。
最近越南盾兑美元汇率出现了由升值变为贬值的逆转性变化，引起关注。实际上，近一年多来越南盾兑美元汇率变化出现了升降交错的变化。第一阶段，2006年底至2007年9月，消费物价从6.6%上升到9%，越南盾汇率从15900越南盾兑1美元下降到16210盾兑1美元，贬值2%。第二阶段，2007年10月至2008年3月，消费物价继续升高，从9.3%升高到19.4%，同时越南盾汇率从贬值改变为升值，从16210盾兑1美元升值到15930盾兑1美元，升值2%，越南盾汇率回升到贬值前2006年的水平。第三阶段，2008年3月至5 月，消费物价从19.4%升高到25.2%，同时越南盾汇率从前几个月的升值转变为贬值，从15930盾兑1美元下降到16245盾兑1美元，贬值2%，越南盾汇率回降到短暂升值前的水平。第四阶段，6月份通货膨胀出现加重趋势，6月1日至6月10日越南盾汇率从16245盾兑1美元上升到16139盾兑 1美元，微升0.7%。第五阶段，6月11日越南汇率从16139盾兑1美元下调到16461盾兑1美元，贬值2%。从2006年底到2008年6月11 日，越南盾汇率总体下降的过程中，出现了两次短暂的上升。这种上升可能跟外汇收支顺差增多有关。在越南盾汇率上升期间，居民愿意持有越南盾，卖出美元。黑市越南盾汇率略高于官方汇率。但是外汇收支顺差所引起的升值力量抵不过通货膨胀突然加重带动起来的贬值加速力量。越南盾汇率上升力量被通货膨胀加剧的冲击力所压倒。官方没有估计到通货膨胀加剧对汇率造成的逆转性冲击，在通货膨胀加重并且人们出现汇率贬值预期的情况下，扩大了汇率每日限定的浮动幅度，将每日限定浮动幅度0.7%调整扩大为1%。
最近国际油价粮价上涨冲击波再次爆发，引发越南居民对国内通货膨胀和越南盾贬值的心理恐慌，通货膨胀预期突变，很多人从前一阶段用美元兑换越南盾改变为用越南盾兑换美元，越南黑市汇率从前一阶段略微高于官方汇率1%-2%改变为大幅度低于官方汇率10%。目前越南盾官方汇率跟一年多前相比贬值3%多，贬值幅度不大。引人关注的是黑市汇率贬值幅度很大。越南黑市汇率主要受越南居民外汇交易影响并且主要受通货膨胀变动趋势影响。在长期通货膨胀及越南盾持续贬值的固定趋势下，越南居民持有美元的意愿较强，居民黑市外汇交易越南盾汇率总体上低于官方汇率。最近一年多来，越南旅游业发展较快，楼市股市上涨，可能吸引境外居民汇入外汇增多，居民在黑市外汇市场上卖出美元增多，出现了以前从来没有过的越南盾汇率上升波动变化。越南黑市汇率变化中的外汇汇入因素影响增强，黑市汇率受通货膨胀和外汇汇入两种力量的影响。外汇汇入增多带来了越南盾汇率上升的变化，这种变化也可能很快就会变成越南盾汇率持续上升的主流趋势。但是，最近通货膨胀加剧带来的贬值压力突然增大，压倒了外汇汇入增加所产生的升值苗头。虽然越南盾的微弱升值苗头被强大的通货膨胀所逆转，但是与过去单一的通货膨胀带来单一方向的持续贬值相比，已经出现了升值和贬值两个相反方向的交叉变化。
最近越南盾汇率从升值逆转为贬值，观察通货膨胀、贸易收支、外资流入、外汇储备等多种因素变化，可以看到，这种逆转主要是通货膨胀加剧带动的居民外汇交易所引起。通货膨胀引发的汇率贬值，不像外资冲击掀起滔天风暴那样凶猛难敌。越南当前发生的这种通货膨胀型贬值变化和中国1994年发生过的贬值变化属于同一类型，贬值波动严重程度不及当时中国。越南和中国一样，在经济转型过程中避不开通货膨胀和汇率市场化改革的大浪冲击。越南当前通货膨胀和外资流入所引起的汇率贬值和升值的交叉变化，不是金融状况恶化的危机爆发，而是遥望彼岸搏击苦海的必经航路。只要通货膨胀得到控制，越南盾的汇率变动将实现从贬值向升值的历史性转变。
Wednesday, June 25, 2008
Sunday, June 15, 2008
暗杀乌云始终笼罩 小说也称奥巴马死于非命
暗杀乌云始终笼罩 小说也称奥巴马死于非命 联合早报
美国民主党候选人奥巴马如今处境更凶险，暗杀的乌云始终在他头上盘旋不去。日前网上有人用短篇小说《奥巴马之死》总结了他被暗杀的结局。
新加坡《联合早报》报道，初选时，奥巴马就遭到克林顿夫妇左右夹攻，现在则得迎战来自共和党阵营更凶狠的明枪暗箭。有人说，奥巴马如今处境更凶险，暗杀的乌云始终在他头上盘旋不去。
《奥巴马之死》，短短两千字，把奥巴马目前的困境刻画得淋漓尽致，结局是奥巴马遇害，希拉里当上总统。这故事纯属虚构，却很有意思。
美国媒体早已指出，在初选过程中，对其个人宗教信仰和爱国热忱的质疑一直困扰着奥巴马。在美国选举中透过质疑政治对手的爱国程度来诋毁其人格的阴招，早已不是什么新鲜事。
由于奥巴马的生父是非洲人，生父和继父都是回教徒，他曾经参加祷告的教堂牧师赖特又有抨击美国的过激言论，再加上他妻子曾说过直到最近才对美国感到自豪之类的话，因此质疑奥巴马是否热爱美国的言论，在部分选民中确有一定市场。
FactCheck.org主任杰克逊指出，2004年选战争期间有不少关于布什及克里的失实传言流传，2008年有关奥巴马的网上谣言“更是恶毒”，指奥巴马是回教原教旨主义者奸细，即属一例。
宗教方面，互联网上一度盛传奥巴马是一个试图摧毁美国的回教徒，还说他小时候曾在一所极端宗教主义学校就学。但事实是，那只是所普通宗教学校。
后来，有人揭发赖特经常发表偏激的反美言论，包括指911恐怖袭击是美国咎由自取，引起舆论哗然，一些媒体甚至把这笔账算到奥巴马头上。
爱国方面，在初选中，奥巴马已见识过反对派阵营，包括希拉里的谋士、非民主党的政坛活跃分子以及观点偏右的传媒中人如何质疑他的爱国心和忠诚度。他们对他的成见与偏见，有不少是源于可笑的谣言，就像小说中那些无中生有的谣传。
奥巴马在初选中学到很多教训，他那奇怪的名字和黑皮肤，使他必须步步为营，免得被外界乱扣帽子，连奥巴马名字中间回教色彩浓厚的“胡先”，也曾被人拿来大做文章。
奥巴马的竞选顾问曾告诉《纽约时报》，他们几乎每天都要调查各路谣言，并把如何回应对手的攻击，变成“一门艺术”。
例如共和党人曾批评奥巴马不够爱国，因为一张照片显示，他在唱国歌时没把手放在心口，也没在衣领系上美国国旗别针。奥巴马的回答是，如果以唱国歌时没把手放在心口来断定一个人是否爱国，那球场上一半的观众岂不是不爱国。
然而，他最后还是向现实低头，在竞选集会上系上国旗别针，尤其是他急需白人蓝领阶级和妇女选票的时候。
最近，田纳西州共和党人翻出旧账，指奥巴马夫人米歇尔2月在一次活动中说过“这是我成年之后第一次为身为美国人而自豪”，而批评她不爱国。《洛杉矶时报》本周有篇特稿指出，随着投票日越来越近，米歇尔在大选前的一举一动，都会成为共和党保守派针对的目标，这可能使她成为奥巴马竞选的负累。
最近网上又有传言说，米歇尔不久前在芝加哥教堂发表谴责白人的言论，包括使用了“whitey”这一包含贬义的字眼，结果被人录了音。著名博客约翰逊在其网志上甚至说，布什总统前政治顾问罗夫有录音副本，共和党将在10月播出录像带，引爆“10月惊奇”，他形容这是颗“计时炸弹”。
罗夫向以出坏主意害人著名。《奥巴马之死》小说中的J博士颇有他的影子。《奥巴马之死》的预言会不会弄假成真，还有待时间证明。但有一点可以肯定，如果奥巴马真的在选前一个月遇刺身亡，美国黑人必将暴动，怒火延烧全国，总统大选恐怕得展期。希拉里未必就能坐享其成。
美国民主党候选人奥巴马如今处境更凶险，暗杀的乌云始终在他头上盘旋不去。日前网上有人用短篇小说《奥巴马之死》总结了他被暗杀的结局。
新加坡《联合早报》报道，初选时，奥巴马就遭到克林顿夫妇左右夹攻，现在则得迎战来自共和党阵营更凶狠的明枪暗箭。有人说，奥巴马如今处境更凶险，暗杀的乌云始终在他头上盘旋不去。
《奥巴马之死》，短短两千字，把奥巴马目前的困境刻画得淋漓尽致，结局是奥巴马遇害，希拉里当上总统。这故事纯属虚构，却很有意思。
美国媒体早已指出，在初选过程中，对其个人宗教信仰和爱国热忱的质疑一直困扰着奥巴马。在美国选举中透过质疑政治对手的爱国程度来诋毁其人格的阴招，早已不是什么新鲜事。
由于奥巴马的生父是非洲人，生父和继父都是回教徒，他曾经参加祷告的教堂牧师赖特又有抨击美国的过激言论，再加上他妻子曾说过直到最近才对美国感到自豪之类的话，因此质疑奥巴马是否热爱美国的言论，在部分选民中确有一定市场。
FactCheck.org主任杰克逊指出，2004年选战争期间有不少关于布什及克里的失实传言流传，2008年有关奥巴马的网上谣言“更是恶毒”，指奥巴马是回教原教旨主义者奸细，即属一例。
宗教方面，互联网上一度盛传奥巴马是一个试图摧毁美国的回教徒，还说他小时候曾在一所极端宗教主义学校就学。但事实是，那只是所普通宗教学校。
后来，有人揭发赖特经常发表偏激的反美言论，包括指911恐怖袭击是美国咎由自取，引起舆论哗然，一些媒体甚至把这笔账算到奥巴马头上。
爱国方面，在初选中，奥巴马已见识过反对派阵营，包括希拉里的谋士、非民主党的政坛活跃分子以及观点偏右的传媒中人如何质疑他的爱国心和忠诚度。他们对他的成见与偏见，有不少是源于可笑的谣言，就像小说中那些无中生有的谣传。
奥巴马在初选中学到很多教训，他那奇怪的名字和黑皮肤，使他必须步步为营，免得被外界乱扣帽子，连奥巴马名字中间回教色彩浓厚的“胡先”，也曾被人拿来大做文章。
奥巴马的竞选顾问曾告诉《纽约时报》，他们几乎每天都要调查各路谣言，并把如何回应对手的攻击，变成“一门艺术”。
例如共和党人曾批评奥巴马不够爱国，因为一张照片显示，他在唱国歌时没把手放在心口，也没在衣领系上美国国旗别针。奥巴马的回答是，如果以唱国歌时没把手放在心口来断定一个人是否爱国，那球场上一半的观众岂不是不爱国。
然而，他最后还是向现实低头，在竞选集会上系上国旗别针，尤其是他急需白人蓝领阶级和妇女选票的时候。
最近，田纳西州共和党人翻出旧账，指奥巴马夫人米歇尔2月在一次活动中说过“这是我成年之后第一次为身为美国人而自豪”，而批评她不爱国。《洛杉矶时报》本周有篇特稿指出，随着投票日越来越近，米歇尔在大选前的一举一动，都会成为共和党保守派针对的目标，这可能使她成为奥巴马竞选的负累。
最近网上又有传言说，米歇尔不久前在芝加哥教堂发表谴责白人的言论，包括使用了“whitey”这一包含贬义的字眼，结果被人录了音。著名博客约翰逊在其网志上甚至说，布什总统前政治顾问罗夫有录音副本，共和党将在10月播出录像带，引爆“10月惊奇”，他形容这是颗“计时炸弹”。
罗夫向以出坏主意害人著名。《奥巴马之死》小说中的J博士颇有他的影子。《奥巴马之死》的预言会不会弄假成真，还有待时间证明。但有一点可以肯定，如果奥巴马真的在选前一个月遇刺身亡，美国黑人必将暴动，怒火延烧全国，总统大选恐怕得展期。希拉里未必就能坐享其成。
Saturday, June 14, 2008
越南货币危机有前车之鉴 热钱曾经整垮日本经济
越南货币危机有前车之鉴 热钱曾经整垮日本经济 广州日报
越南金融危机可能性微乎其微
据新华社电 “目前，越南经济确实遇到了很大困难，但越南发生金融危机的可能性微乎其微。”越南社科院下属的越南经济院副院长陈庭天表示。
面临一场“货币危机”
今年年初以来，越南股市大幅下跌，汇市剧烈波动，通货膨胀率居高不下，贸易逆差不断扩大。
摩根士丹利公司因此发布报告说，种种迹象表明，越南正面临一场“货币危机”，这场危机与引发1997年亚洲金融危机的泰铢危机一样。这份报告像一颗重磅炸弹，引发了外界对越南爆发“金融危机”的种种猜测。其直接后果是，越南自由市场美元对越南盾汇率短期内出现更加剧烈的波动。
陈庭天颇为激动地批评外界只看到问题的表象就对越南经济妄加评判。他指出，越南经济与泰国经济存在根本性的区别：越南资本市场并未完全放开；越南经济仍以较快速度增长，今年头5个月经济增长7.4％；越南的国有经济在能源、电力、金融等国民经济最重要的领域发挥着主导作用。
承认越南经济陷困境
陈庭天认为，越南经济陷入困境的原因主要有两个：其一，国际油价、粮价、原材料价格持续上升，导致越南生产成本增加和粮价及其他食品价格暴涨，加大了通胀压力。其二，近年来，特别是2007年，信贷和外国直接投资强劲增长，导致货币供应量大幅增加，通胀压力骤增。而越南政府在这方面反应迟钝，导致经济过热及多年来沉积下来的问题集中爆发。
他指出，通胀率大幅上升，贸易逆差迅速扩大，这是十分严重的问题。一般来说，高通胀是由经济过热及货币供应过量所致，但只要注重经济增长的质量，就能以最少的资金换取最大的增长，就可以缩小资金投放，减少通胀压力。在这方面，中国的经验值得越南学习和借鉴。
陈庭天并不认为越南经济困难会波及周边国家。他说，越南受世界经济的影响很大，但对世界经济的影响很小，因为越南的国内生产总值只有700多亿美元。况且，越南目前也没有发生外界所谓的“金融危机”。
银行调高存款利率
在越南国家银行将基准利率提高之后，越南各主要商业银行12日已纷纷调整了越南盾的存款利率，其平均年利率由原来的约14％提高到约17％。
为了应对通货膨胀压力及稳定经济，越南国家银行从11日起将越南基准利率由原来的12％上调至14％，再贷款利率从原来的13％调至15％，贴现利率从原来的11％调到13％。5月中旬，越南国家银行曾把基准利率由原来的8.75％调为12％。
专家
锐评
越南金融危机:国际资本的一次杰作
越南金融危机，是国际资本的又一次杰作。它们先是悄悄涌入越南，盘踞到房市和股市中，推高越南房价和股价，带动起物价上涨，制造通货膨胀，然后，在房价与股价涨至高位时悄悄获利了结，从而使得越南从天堂坠入地狱。一如当年美国及国际热钱整垮日本时的情景完美再现。
先看房价：越南地价、房价持续上涨，持续时间长达十年。由于地价上涨过快，投资于越南胡志明市工业园的国外投资者要付出两倍于泰国曼谷工业园的租金价格。而现在，越南大、中城市房地产价格平均下跌已达50%以上！
再看股市：从2005年到2007年3月12日的两年多时间中，越南股市涨了5倍。到2007年1月份时，越南股市指标股的平均市盈率就已高达 73倍，成为“世界增长率最高的股市”，越南监管部门对外资入场不仅不限制，甚至还采取鼓励的政策。而现在，越南股市在至今为止的短短一个多月时间里，跌幅已经达到64%！
再看升值：越南盾一直保持小幅升值趋势。今年3月下旬，越南政府将越南盾与外币的浮动幅度由0.75%扩大到1%。但快速的升值缩短了热钱获利成本，为热钱最后获利了结提供方便。而一旦热钱完成套现过程，那么，本币贬值就变得难以避免。
越南的惨状，就是热钱获利后撤离的结果。只要给热钱获利的机会，他们就会拿走黄金，留下一地鸡毛。
(时寒冰)
金融困境被夸大危机仅仅是征兆
进入2008年以来，越南米价一度飞涨，大米的价格标签几乎每天都在刷新。
核心提示
江涌：
经济学博士、中国现代国际关系研究院经济安全研究中心主任，主要从事经济安全与世界经济理论研究。
越南现在是不是处在危机状态，国内外学术界的看法并不一致，包括西方社会在内也没有形成统一的意见。
我个人认为，现在说越南处在危机的说法有些夸大，准确地说处在危机的边缘。
——江涌
杨保筠：
法国巴黎第七大学东方学博士，北京大学国际关系学院教授、博士生导师，北京大学亚太研究中心副主任，北京大学东南亚研究中心副主任。
现在越南经济确实遇到了空前困难，并出现了金融危机的某些前兆，但目前将这些征兆称为“金融危机”就有些夸大了。这还不至于发展到1997年的那种状态，很难引发新一轮亚洲金融危机。
——杨保筠
近期，越南金融领域出现很多不稳定现象，通货膨胀严重，股市折腰跌损，越南盾随美元走势疲软，并且出现大量国际资本外逃。从表面上看，越南经济形势与1997年泰国爆发“金融危机”时的境况如出一辙。摩根士丹利公司因此发布报告称，种种迹象表明，越南正面临一场“货币危机”。那么，越南真的会像泰国那样发生“金融危机”吗？本周圆桌会议我们特邀专家一起探讨这个问题。 （记者 李明波）
困难确实空前 危机仅是前兆
广州日报：越南现在的经济困境，能否看成是陷入了金融危机？
江涌：越南现在是不是处在危机状态，国内外学术界看法并不一致，包括西方在内也没有形成统一的意见。现在认为越南处在危机状态的说法，主要是来自越南境外的媒体。值得注意的是，日本在越南的投资相当多，但日本国内媒体对这方面的报道少得可怜。
我个人认为，现在说越南处在危机的说法有些夸大，准确地说是处在危机边缘。这是因为：第一，从越南人的自身感受看，他们这一代人曾经历过越南上世纪80年代的金融危机，那时通货膨胀率有百分之几百，现在只有百分之几十，自然就不会有太严重的感觉；第二，越南政府一直不认为国内存在危机；第三，最终的危机应该表现为货币危机，但现在越南盾的贬值幅度在40%左右，还没有到特别严重的程度。
杨保筠：越南金融危机最早的说法，来自摩根士丹利公司年初的一份报告。这份报告像一颗重磅炸弹，引发了外界对越南爆发“金融危机”的种种猜测。
从经济数据上看，越南现在确实出现了金融危机的表现。比如，股市短短8个月的时间里从1100多点下跌至不到400点；越南盾兑换美元的贬值幅度达到40%；越南胡志明市的楼市也下跌了约50%。不过这些情况相比1997年的亚洲金融风暴，明显强很多。
可以说，越南经济确实遇到了空前困难，并出现了金融危机的某些前兆，但目前将征兆称为“金融危机”有些夸大。
发展快隐藏问题 能源涨价诱危机
广州日报：不管怎么说，越南经济现在确实遇到了很大困难，为何原本被国际社会看好的越南经济会出现这样严重的问题？
江涌：越南出现的问题，从内部因素看主要是由于开放步伐过快、过大导致的。“过大”主要是指越南金融自由化的步伐过大。“过快”主要指以下三个方面：
第一，对经济发展目标制定了过快的速度。国际社会一直非常看好越南的经济前景，把它称为维斯塔五国之一，仅次于金砖四国。不过正是这种乐观情绪，壮大了越南的雄心壮志，经济发展目标反复调整，甚至提出不切实际的“赶中超印”的口号。
第二，对外开放速度过快。2006年年底入世后，越南加快了开放的步伐，吸引了大量外资，不过由于越南市场本身容纳有限，很难转化成现实购买力，因此形成流动性过剩，由此造成了本币泡沫，股市和房产市场膨胀严重。
第三，越南进口的能源和原材料价格上涨过快。今年，全球范围的粮食和石油价格暴涨，越南急于创造业绩，缩小自己的贸易逆差，只能大量出口大米，结果导致国内一度供应紧张，出现抢购风波。
从外部因素看，一是国际范围的能源价格上涨，拖累了越南经济。二是越南受到了美国次贷风波的影响，它也是自去年爆发的美国次贷危机之下倒下的第一块多米诺骨牌。当初次贷爆发之后，很多热钱涌入了越南，没有引起越南方面的警惕。
杨保筠： 除了上述因素外，从深层次看，越南经济正处在转型过程中，其经济体制和金融体制的适应能力不强，经济体适应弹性较差；另外，越南经济政策上也有失误。综合而言，越南的这次经济危机，是国际大环境和内部因素共同作用导致的。实际上，越南遇到的问题是处在转型期的发展中国家都可能遇到的，甚至是不可避免的。
地区合作机制成熟 不会引发连锁效应
广州日报：很多人担心越南可能成为新一轮亚洲金融危机的导火索，重演1997年的悲剧。越南会成为倒下的第一块多米诺骨牌吗？
江涌：现在的越南与1997年的泰国确实有很多相似之处。比如，对外开放的步伐过快，贸易逆差扩大，外汇储备难应对外债，股票和房地产市场泡沫严重等。
不过，现在的越南与1997年的泰国所处的时代发生了很大改变。第一，由于有过类似教训，东南亚各国都表现出了足够的警惕。现在，东南亚很多国家的外汇储备都很丰富，也积累了很多对付投机客的经验。
第二，地区合作机制从无到有。1997年经济风暴时。东南亚地区并没有一套行之有效的合作机制，当时日本由于国内本身也出现了问题，因此它最早逃之夭夭。
而如今，东盟和中日韩的“10+3机制”等都已经很成熟，东亚外汇储备的建立，也对稳定东南亚金融秩序有很大作用。日本也非常热衷于参与东南亚事务，已经对中南半岛问题的参与热情很高。
杨保筠：越南目前的情况，与亚洲金融危机前泰国的情况有一定的类似，包括资本出逃、贸易赤字、货币贬值压力等。但现在越南的资本流出和货币贬值，还不至于发展到1997年的那种状态，很难引发新一轮亚洲金融危机。这是因为：
第一，虽然越南现在的经济开放程度很高，但越南经济的区域影响力还很有限，也难以起到推动多米诺骨牌的效应。
第二，由于体制的原因，越南政府在宏观调控方面是有一定经验的，会对经济过热适度降温。
第三，来自国际社会的援助也会帮助越南克服目前困难。中国和东南亚周边国家不会坐视不管，有了1997年金融危机的前车之鉴，大家都不愿看到越南的危机恶化。
因此我认为，越南的这次危机会对周边国家产生影响，但不会很大，更不会导致整个地区的金融危机。
广州日报：越南经济的困难还会持续多久？
江涌：现在很难判断。有专家说，起码在两个月内越南要面对金融动荡的局面。有悲观的观点认为，起码在今年之内，越南经济都难有起色。
越南当前金融问题 警示新兴市场国家
广州日报：越南经济出现的这一系列问题，给广大新兴市场国家带来怎么样的教训？
江涌：越南这次出现的问题，确实对广大新兴市场国家提供了警示。
第一，对外开放的步伐一定要有节奏。一旦开放的步伐过快就很容易出现问题，必须确保对外开放有序和渐进。
第二，一定要把对外开放的主动权掌握在自己手中。越南经济改革的大框架是在日本人的设计下进行的。事实证明，最了解本国国情的人是自己。
第三，在开放过程中要加强监管，特别是金融领域的监管，避免国际热钱的炒作。
第四，防止在经济发展中急躁冒进。在开放过程中，新兴国家应避免陷入经济主义的泥淖，不能用过去的经验来指导未来的发展，必须经过更细致的论证才行。
杨保筠：教训确实非常大。冷战结束以来，随着全球化的发展，各国普遍重视发展经济，很多新兴国家发展太快，只追求经济的高速增长，忽视了经济的结构性、内在性矛盾，对国内存在的问题认识不足，应对危机的能力也不强。
第二，越南遇到的问题不是越南所独有的，这也是很多发展中国家都面临的问题。
第三，全球化让世界各国的经济联系更加密切，我们必须警惕这种危机的蔓延性，全球共同合作，共同采取措施应对危机。
越南金融危机可能性微乎其微
据新华社电 “目前，越南经济确实遇到了很大困难，但越南发生金融危机的可能性微乎其微。”越南社科院下属的越南经济院副院长陈庭天表示。
面临一场“货币危机”
今年年初以来，越南股市大幅下跌，汇市剧烈波动，通货膨胀率居高不下，贸易逆差不断扩大。
摩根士丹利公司因此发布报告说，种种迹象表明，越南正面临一场“货币危机”，这场危机与引发1997年亚洲金融危机的泰铢危机一样。这份报告像一颗重磅炸弹，引发了外界对越南爆发“金融危机”的种种猜测。其直接后果是，越南自由市场美元对越南盾汇率短期内出现更加剧烈的波动。
陈庭天颇为激动地批评外界只看到问题的表象就对越南经济妄加评判。他指出，越南经济与泰国经济存在根本性的区别：越南资本市场并未完全放开；越南经济仍以较快速度增长，今年头5个月经济增长7.4％；越南的国有经济在能源、电力、金融等国民经济最重要的领域发挥着主导作用。
承认越南经济陷困境
陈庭天认为，越南经济陷入困境的原因主要有两个：其一，国际油价、粮价、原材料价格持续上升，导致越南生产成本增加和粮价及其他食品价格暴涨，加大了通胀压力。其二，近年来，特别是2007年，信贷和外国直接投资强劲增长，导致货币供应量大幅增加，通胀压力骤增。而越南政府在这方面反应迟钝，导致经济过热及多年来沉积下来的问题集中爆发。
他指出，通胀率大幅上升，贸易逆差迅速扩大，这是十分严重的问题。一般来说，高通胀是由经济过热及货币供应过量所致，但只要注重经济增长的质量，就能以最少的资金换取最大的增长，就可以缩小资金投放，减少通胀压力。在这方面，中国的经验值得越南学习和借鉴。
陈庭天并不认为越南经济困难会波及周边国家。他说，越南受世界经济的影响很大，但对世界经济的影响很小，因为越南的国内生产总值只有700多亿美元。况且，越南目前也没有发生外界所谓的“金融危机”。
银行调高存款利率
在越南国家银行将基准利率提高之后，越南各主要商业银行12日已纷纷调整了越南盾的存款利率，其平均年利率由原来的约14％提高到约17％。
为了应对通货膨胀压力及稳定经济，越南国家银行从11日起将越南基准利率由原来的12％上调至14％，再贷款利率从原来的13％调至15％，贴现利率从原来的11％调到13％。5月中旬，越南国家银行曾把基准利率由原来的8.75％调为12％。
专家
锐评
越南金融危机:国际资本的一次杰作
越南金融危机，是国际资本的又一次杰作。它们先是悄悄涌入越南，盘踞到房市和股市中，推高越南房价和股价，带动起物价上涨，制造通货膨胀，然后，在房价与股价涨至高位时悄悄获利了结，从而使得越南从天堂坠入地狱。一如当年美国及国际热钱整垮日本时的情景完美再现。
先看房价：越南地价、房价持续上涨，持续时间长达十年。由于地价上涨过快，投资于越南胡志明市工业园的国外投资者要付出两倍于泰国曼谷工业园的租金价格。而现在，越南大、中城市房地产价格平均下跌已达50%以上！
再看股市：从2005年到2007年3月12日的两年多时间中，越南股市涨了5倍。到2007年1月份时，越南股市指标股的平均市盈率就已高达 73倍，成为“世界增长率最高的股市”，越南监管部门对外资入场不仅不限制，甚至还采取鼓励的政策。而现在，越南股市在至今为止的短短一个多月时间里，跌幅已经达到64%！
再看升值：越南盾一直保持小幅升值趋势。今年3月下旬，越南政府将越南盾与外币的浮动幅度由0.75%扩大到1%。但快速的升值缩短了热钱获利成本，为热钱最后获利了结提供方便。而一旦热钱完成套现过程，那么，本币贬值就变得难以避免。
越南的惨状，就是热钱获利后撤离的结果。只要给热钱获利的机会，他们就会拿走黄金，留下一地鸡毛。
(时寒冰)
金融困境被夸大危机仅仅是征兆
进入2008年以来，越南米价一度飞涨，大米的价格标签几乎每天都在刷新。
核心提示
江涌：
经济学博士、中国现代国际关系研究院经济安全研究中心主任，主要从事经济安全与世界经济理论研究。
越南现在是不是处在危机状态，国内外学术界的看法并不一致，包括西方社会在内也没有形成统一的意见。
我个人认为，现在说越南处在危机的说法有些夸大，准确地说处在危机的边缘。
——江涌
杨保筠：
法国巴黎第七大学东方学博士，北京大学国际关系学院教授、博士生导师，北京大学亚太研究中心副主任，北京大学东南亚研究中心副主任。
现在越南经济确实遇到了空前困难，并出现了金融危机的某些前兆，但目前将这些征兆称为“金融危机”就有些夸大了。这还不至于发展到1997年的那种状态，很难引发新一轮亚洲金融危机。
——杨保筠
近期，越南金融领域出现很多不稳定现象，通货膨胀严重，股市折腰跌损，越南盾随美元走势疲软，并且出现大量国际资本外逃。从表面上看，越南经济形势与1997年泰国爆发“金融危机”时的境况如出一辙。摩根士丹利公司因此发布报告称，种种迹象表明，越南正面临一场“货币危机”。那么，越南真的会像泰国那样发生“金融危机”吗？本周圆桌会议我们特邀专家一起探讨这个问题。 （记者 李明波）
困难确实空前 危机仅是前兆
广州日报：越南现在的经济困境，能否看成是陷入了金融危机？
江涌：越南现在是不是处在危机状态，国内外学术界看法并不一致，包括西方在内也没有形成统一的意见。现在认为越南处在危机状态的说法，主要是来自越南境外的媒体。值得注意的是，日本在越南的投资相当多，但日本国内媒体对这方面的报道少得可怜。
我个人认为，现在说越南处在危机的说法有些夸大，准确地说是处在危机边缘。这是因为：第一，从越南人的自身感受看，他们这一代人曾经历过越南上世纪80年代的金融危机，那时通货膨胀率有百分之几百，现在只有百分之几十，自然就不会有太严重的感觉；第二，越南政府一直不认为国内存在危机；第三，最终的危机应该表现为货币危机，但现在越南盾的贬值幅度在40%左右，还没有到特别严重的程度。
杨保筠：越南金融危机最早的说法，来自摩根士丹利公司年初的一份报告。这份报告像一颗重磅炸弹，引发了外界对越南爆发“金融危机”的种种猜测。
从经济数据上看，越南现在确实出现了金融危机的表现。比如，股市短短8个月的时间里从1100多点下跌至不到400点；越南盾兑换美元的贬值幅度达到40%；越南胡志明市的楼市也下跌了约50%。不过这些情况相比1997年的亚洲金融风暴，明显强很多。
可以说，越南经济确实遇到了空前困难，并出现了金融危机的某些前兆，但目前将征兆称为“金融危机”有些夸大。
发展快隐藏问题 能源涨价诱危机
广州日报：不管怎么说，越南经济现在确实遇到了很大困难，为何原本被国际社会看好的越南经济会出现这样严重的问题？
江涌：越南出现的问题，从内部因素看主要是由于开放步伐过快、过大导致的。“过大”主要是指越南金融自由化的步伐过大。“过快”主要指以下三个方面：
第一，对经济发展目标制定了过快的速度。国际社会一直非常看好越南的经济前景，把它称为维斯塔五国之一，仅次于金砖四国。不过正是这种乐观情绪，壮大了越南的雄心壮志，经济发展目标反复调整，甚至提出不切实际的“赶中超印”的口号。
第二，对外开放速度过快。2006年年底入世后，越南加快了开放的步伐，吸引了大量外资，不过由于越南市场本身容纳有限，很难转化成现实购买力，因此形成流动性过剩，由此造成了本币泡沫，股市和房产市场膨胀严重。
第三，越南进口的能源和原材料价格上涨过快。今年，全球范围的粮食和石油价格暴涨，越南急于创造业绩，缩小自己的贸易逆差，只能大量出口大米，结果导致国内一度供应紧张，出现抢购风波。
从外部因素看，一是国际范围的能源价格上涨，拖累了越南经济。二是越南受到了美国次贷风波的影响，它也是自去年爆发的美国次贷危机之下倒下的第一块多米诺骨牌。当初次贷爆发之后，很多热钱涌入了越南，没有引起越南方面的警惕。
杨保筠： 除了上述因素外，从深层次看，越南经济正处在转型过程中，其经济体制和金融体制的适应能力不强，经济体适应弹性较差；另外，越南经济政策上也有失误。综合而言，越南的这次经济危机，是国际大环境和内部因素共同作用导致的。实际上，越南遇到的问题是处在转型期的发展中国家都可能遇到的，甚至是不可避免的。
地区合作机制成熟 不会引发连锁效应
广州日报：很多人担心越南可能成为新一轮亚洲金融危机的导火索，重演1997年的悲剧。越南会成为倒下的第一块多米诺骨牌吗？
江涌：现在的越南与1997年的泰国确实有很多相似之处。比如，对外开放的步伐过快，贸易逆差扩大，外汇储备难应对外债，股票和房地产市场泡沫严重等。
不过，现在的越南与1997年的泰国所处的时代发生了很大改变。第一，由于有过类似教训，东南亚各国都表现出了足够的警惕。现在，东南亚很多国家的外汇储备都很丰富，也积累了很多对付投机客的经验。
第二，地区合作机制从无到有。1997年经济风暴时。东南亚地区并没有一套行之有效的合作机制，当时日本由于国内本身也出现了问题，因此它最早逃之夭夭。
而如今，东盟和中日韩的“10+3机制”等都已经很成熟，东亚外汇储备的建立，也对稳定东南亚金融秩序有很大作用。日本也非常热衷于参与东南亚事务，已经对中南半岛问题的参与热情很高。
杨保筠：越南目前的情况，与亚洲金融危机前泰国的情况有一定的类似，包括资本出逃、贸易赤字、货币贬值压力等。但现在越南的资本流出和货币贬值，还不至于发展到1997年的那种状态，很难引发新一轮亚洲金融危机。这是因为：
第一，虽然越南现在的经济开放程度很高，但越南经济的区域影响力还很有限，也难以起到推动多米诺骨牌的效应。
第二，由于体制的原因，越南政府在宏观调控方面是有一定经验的，会对经济过热适度降温。
第三，来自国际社会的援助也会帮助越南克服目前困难。中国和东南亚周边国家不会坐视不管，有了1997年金融危机的前车之鉴，大家都不愿看到越南的危机恶化。
因此我认为，越南的这次危机会对周边国家产生影响，但不会很大，更不会导致整个地区的金融危机。
广州日报：越南经济的困难还会持续多久？
江涌：现在很难判断。有专家说，起码在两个月内越南要面对金融动荡的局面。有悲观的观点认为，起码在今年之内，越南经济都难有起色。
越南当前金融问题 警示新兴市场国家
广州日报：越南经济出现的这一系列问题，给广大新兴市场国家带来怎么样的教训？
江涌：越南这次出现的问题，确实对广大新兴市场国家提供了警示。
第一，对外开放的步伐一定要有节奏。一旦开放的步伐过快就很容易出现问题，必须确保对外开放有序和渐进。
第二，一定要把对外开放的主动权掌握在自己手中。越南经济改革的大框架是在日本人的设计下进行的。事实证明，最了解本国国情的人是自己。
第三，在开放过程中要加强监管，特别是金融领域的监管，避免国际热钱的炒作。
第四，防止在经济发展中急躁冒进。在开放过程中，新兴国家应避免陷入经济主义的泥淖，不能用过去的经验来指导未来的发展，必须经过更细致的论证才行。
杨保筠：教训确实非常大。冷战结束以来，随着全球化的发展，各国普遍重视发展经济，很多新兴国家发展太快，只追求经济的高速增长，忽视了经济的结构性、内在性矛盾，对国内存在的问题认识不足，应对危机的能力也不强。
第二，越南遇到的问题不是越南所独有的，这也是很多发展中国家都面临的问题。
第三，全球化让世界各国的经济联系更加密切，我们必须警惕这种危机的蔓延性，全球共同合作，共同采取措施应对危机。
Friday, June 13, 2008
越南股市终止25日连跌 收盘微升
越南股市终止25日连跌 收盘微升
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年06月13日 02:38 中国证券网-上海证券报
越南央行双管齐下的“托市”举措似乎已开始收到初步成效。继11日股指盘中上演绝地反击的好戏之后，昨天越南股市又一举收出了4月底以来的首根阳线，收盘微升0.03%，终止了此前连续25天的跌势。
⊙本报记者 朱周良
市场人士表示，股指年内缩水超过六成，吸引了部分投资人进场逢低买入。不过，不过从国内还是国外来看，投资人对越南经济和股市的信心仍有待恢复。
昨天收盘，胡志明市股票交易所基准的VN指数小幅上涨0.03%，报370.55点。这也是该指数自4月29日以来首次收出阳线。过去25个交易日中，VN指数累计下跌了29%，平均每天下跌近1.2%。
个股中，89家个股出现上涨，55家下跌，另有7家个股持平。第二大权重股PetroVietnam Fertilizer涨幅居首，收升700盾，升幅为2%。
不过，股指年内迄今为止的累计跌幅仍高达60.03%。过去几年，特别是越南加入世贸组织之后，由于投资人持续看好越南的经济增长前景，该国历史不过八年的股市也异常火爆。2006年，越南股市曾以超过140%的涨幅笑傲全球，去年的涨幅也达到23%。
尽管外界对后市的看法仍存在分歧，但从技术层面而言，买入信号已经显现。11日，VN指数的14天相对强弱指标跌至6.5。而一般而言，低于30就被认为是超跌和可以买入的信号。相比最高峰时期的30倍，越南股市的市盈率目前已跌至10倍以下。
分析师指出，越南央行10日宣布加息和一次性货币贬值2%的紧急举措，一定程度上缓解了投资人对于该国陷入全面金融危机的担忧。越南5月份通胀率高达25%，为至少1992年以来最高水平。摩根士丹利和德意志银行等机构都预言，通胀持续飙升可能导致越南出现货币危机。
河内某券商的一位分析师表示，央行本周再次加息的举动，“长期而言对经济是利好，也有助于改善投资信心”。央行10日宣布，从11日起将越南基准利率由原来的12％上调至14％。
不过也有人注意到，股市要完全恢复稳定还有待时日。比如，周四上涨的个股中大多是小型企业，绩优股仍跌声一片。而股指随最终收高，但盘中仍一度下跌0.6%。
与此同时，官方统计显示，本周三，海外投资者仍净卖出40亿越南盾（约243900美元）的越南股票，表明外国投资人仍对越南股市持观望态度。海外投资者的成交量目前约占越南股市总成交的14%。
IPA投资公司的分析师Tong Minh Tuan则指出，股指持续性反弹还需一段时间，主要原因是银行的流动性问题仍未解决。他表示，股市回暖很大程度上可能要取决于银行业的稳定。
在汇市，越南盾对美元官方汇率周四几近持平，前一天曾大幅下滑2%。越南央行周四设定的官方汇率为16458，稍稍低于周三的16461，但仍远低于黑市和海外远期外汇市场上越南盾的汇率水准。黑市上美元对越南盾目前徘徊在18000盾左右，远期市场显示未来一年盾可能贬值近30%。
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年06月13日 02:38 中国证券网-上海证券报
越南央行双管齐下的“托市”举措似乎已开始收到初步成效。继11日股指盘中上演绝地反击的好戏之后，昨天越南股市又一举收出了4月底以来的首根阳线，收盘微升0.03%，终止了此前连续25天的跌势。
⊙本报记者 朱周良
市场人士表示，股指年内缩水超过六成，吸引了部分投资人进场逢低买入。不过，不过从国内还是国外来看，投资人对越南经济和股市的信心仍有待恢复。
昨天收盘，胡志明市股票交易所基准的VN指数小幅上涨0.03%，报370.55点。这也是该指数自4月29日以来首次收出阳线。过去25个交易日中，VN指数累计下跌了29%，平均每天下跌近1.2%。
个股中，89家个股出现上涨，55家下跌，另有7家个股持平。第二大权重股PetroVietnam Fertilizer涨幅居首，收升700盾，升幅为2%。
不过，股指年内迄今为止的累计跌幅仍高达60.03%。过去几年，特别是越南加入世贸组织之后，由于投资人持续看好越南的经济增长前景，该国历史不过八年的股市也异常火爆。2006年，越南股市曾以超过140%的涨幅笑傲全球，去年的涨幅也达到23%。
尽管外界对后市的看法仍存在分歧，但从技术层面而言，买入信号已经显现。11日，VN指数的14天相对强弱指标跌至6.5。而一般而言，低于30就被认为是超跌和可以买入的信号。相比最高峰时期的30倍，越南股市的市盈率目前已跌至10倍以下。
分析师指出，越南央行10日宣布加息和一次性货币贬值2%的紧急举措，一定程度上缓解了投资人对于该国陷入全面金融危机的担忧。越南5月份通胀率高达25%，为至少1992年以来最高水平。摩根士丹利和德意志银行等机构都预言，通胀持续飙升可能导致越南出现货币危机。
河内某券商的一位分析师表示，央行本周再次加息的举动，“长期而言对经济是利好，也有助于改善投资信心”。央行10日宣布，从11日起将越南基准利率由原来的12％上调至14％。
不过也有人注意到，股市要完全恢复稳定还有待时日。比如，周四上涨的个股中大多是小型企业，绩优股仍跌声一片。而股指随最终收高，但盘中仍一度下跌0.6%。
与此同时，官方统计显示，本周三，海外投资者仍净卖出40亿越南盾（约243900美元）的越南股票，表明外国投资人仍对越南股市持观望态度。海外投资者的成交量目前约占越南股市总成交的14%。
IPA投资公司的分析师Tong Minh Tuan则指出，股指持续性反弹还需一段时间，主要原因是银行的流动性问题仍未解决。他表示，股市回暖很大程度上可能要取决于银行业的稳定。
在汇市，越南盾对美元官方汇率周四几近持平，前一天曾大幅下滑2%。越南央行周四设定的官方汇率为16458，稍稍低于周三的16461，但仍远低于黑市和海外远期外汇市场上越南盾的汇率水准。黑市上美元对越南盾目前徘徊在18000盾左右，远期市场显示未来一年盾可能贬值近30%。
越南投资者最高股市亏损高达90%
越南投资者最高股市亏损高达90%
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年06月13日 05:13 中国证券报-中证网
“我们的情况没有外界想的那么糟”
□本报记者 易非 徐国杰 越南报道
令西贡证券24岁的新员工阮玉美凤想不到的是，自她跨出校门后大半年，越南股市几乎再没上涨过，“以前蜂拥开户的盛况，我只是听人说说，而自我工作以来开户量很少。”
阮玉美凤找到工作时，胡志明交易所VN指数900多点，正值从1100多的高位掉头向下时期，但在当时，几乎所有的投资者都没有意识到，股市正在展开最惨烈的一波杀跌。仅仅半年时间，指数跌至6月12日收盘的370.55点，跌幅约67%。
虽然越南股市一直在跌，但直到最近，阮玉美凤的上级——西贡证券公司证券业务二部经理阮富强才频繁接到中国台湾地区客户的电话。对此，阮富强非常重视，因为台湾客户是其最重要的海外客户。
这些客户看到媒体对越南经济危机的报道后，心里都有些忐忑不安。“不过，他们的这些担心很容易消除。因为除了我以外，他们也有自己了解越南经济状况的渠道。”阮富强说，这些台湾地区客户的很多亲戚都在越南开店开厂、娶妻生子，他们从亲戚那里了解到，越南的经济并没有太大问题。
成立于1999年的西贡证券股份有限公司是越南最大的证券公司之一，拥有9家证券营业部。记者昨日去的西贡证券总部是海外客户以及机构法人的重要经纪商，据说占到了海外机构法人在越南开户的四成。
由于市场持续下跌，越南股市人气极度低迷，在上午交易的黄金(195,-0.31,-0.16%,吧)时间里，西贡证券散户大厅仅仅坐了三分之一还不到，前来开户的人更是寥寥无几，大厅里冷冷清清，投资者有些茫然地看着股市，许久才有一人站起，填好交易单去交给柜台由其代为下单。
阮富强介绍说，如果从高点算起，不少越南投资者的亏损高达80%，甚至高达90%。特别是去年指数上升到1100点时，有一批新投资者来开户，他们基本上都是退休老人、小摊小贩、家庭主妇之类，而在最高点接棒，受损显而易见。
在胡志明市土生土长的导游谢先生就是这样一个典型。他以前对股市根本不懂，看到前年股市涨疯了，也投了相当于人民币10万元的资金进去，而现在只剩下3万多了。
阮富强认为，股市跌到现在，也许正是比较好的投资机会。也就在昨日，越南股市结束了4月29日以来的连续下跌行情，在370点左右企稳，有关人士认为，这有可能表明该指数在今年下跌约60%后终于暂时获得了支撑。
“我们一直认为，情况没有那么悲观。”阮富强直截了当地指出，唯一需要担心的是，政府在控制通胀上出手过慢，其较高的利率也给中小银行和企业造成了很大的压力，会使得经济发展面临很多新问题。
而阮富强手下的业务员梁氏垂梅则对经济情况更为乐观，她有些激动地说，“我觉得越南的经济危机其实是某些国外组织写出来的，他们一年前还把我们的经济写得阳光一片，一年之后又写得漆黑一团，其实就我们自身的感觉来说，没有什么很大的变化，政府对于通胀的控制措施应该很得力。”
她的话得到了一部分越南市民的认可，他们觉得，高达25%的通胀似乎仅仅是一个高高在纸面上的数字。
骑着摩托的陈方说，他并没有过多地感受到通胀的压力，一年前92标号汽油一公升是1.1万盾（1元人民币可换2600越南盾），而近期是1.45万盾，他的摩托还能开得起。陈方把记者带到了胡志明市最大的自由百货市场——安东市场，这里集饮食、服装、金银首饰、海鲜销售等于一身，各类物品琳琅满目。金财档位的老板娘张金玉指着档位上的腰果、茶叶、咖啡等各类物品说，一年来这些东西并没有涨价。旁边几位越南客户也正在与老板侃着价，并不急着购买。记者见到，在整个安东市场，生意最好的显然属于黄金档铺，但人也并不多，其中皇燕档口的小姑娘说，现在24K纯金只比一年前涨了30%。
然而，尽管像陈方、梁氏垂梅这样的越南市民认为通胀并不值得忧虑，但关心越南证券市场的投资人士却把通胀水平减缓视为股市见底的最重要标志。
根据西贡证券5月中旬的统计，胡志明及河内两个市场中，净资产收益率超过10%、PE低于10倍的股票比比皆是，据记者粗略统计，两市绝大部分股票PE在15倍以下，净资产收益率高于10%的股票超过总数的一半。虽然如此之低，但高通胀显然让海外投资者不会马上进场，“现在虽然跌了很多，但我还要等一下，等越南的通胀水平降到20%以下才考虑进场。”一位海外投资者接受记者电话采访时表示。这对于越南来说，也许是今年下半年需要想尽一切招数才能达到的目标。
对于越南股市前景，阮富强等绝大多数人则保持了相当的自信，“大机会还没有来，越南现在上市的只是传统企业，真正核心的国家级企业还没有上市。”曾在台湾地区留过学的阮富强，对于中国股市也很有研究，他认为目前的越南股市正像早期的中国A股，上市公司行业代表性并不强，真正有实力的大型国企或是一些行业龙头并未上市。目前，越南最大的一家银行正在筹划IPO，随着这些龙头企业的陆续民营化，将有可能成为吸引资金重新入市的一个契机。
http://www.sina.com.cn 2008年06月13日 05:13 中国证券报-中证网
“我们的情况没有外界想的那么糟”
□本报记者 易非 徐国杰 越南报道
令西贡证券24岁的新员工阮玉美凤想不到的是，自她跨出校门后大半年，越南股市几乎再没上涨过，“以前蜂拥开户的盛况，我只是听人说说，而自我工作以来开户量很少。”
阮玉美凤找到工作时，胡志明交易所VN指数900多点，正值从1100多的高位掉头向下时期，但在当时，几乎所有的投资者都没有意识到，股市正在展开最惨烈的一波杀跌。仅仅半年时间，指数跌至6月12日收盘的370.55点，跌幅约67%。
虽然越南股市一直在跌，但直到最近，阮玉美凤的上级——西贡证券公司证券业务二部经理阮富强才频繁接到中国台湾地区客户的电话。对此，阮富强非常重视，因为台湾客户是其最重要的海外客户。
这些客户看到媒体对越南经济危机的报道后，心里都有些忐忑不安。“不过，他们的这些担心很容易消除。因为除了我以外，他们也有自己了解越南经济状况的渠道。”阮富强说，这些台湾地区客户的很多亲戚都在越南开店开厂、娶妻生子，他们从亲戚那里了解到，越南的经济并没有太大问题。
成立于1999年的西贡证券股份有限公司是越南最大的证券公司之一，拥有9家证券营业部。记者昨日去的西贡证券总部是海外客户以及机构法人的重要经纪商，据说占到了海外机构法人在越南开户的四成。
由于市场持续下跌，越南股市人气极度低迷，在上午交易的黄金(195,-0.31,-0.16%,吧)时间里，西贡证券散户大厅仅仅坐了三分之一还不到，前来开户的人更是寥寥无几，大厅里冷冷清清，投资者有些茫然地看着股市，许久才有一人站起，填好交易单去交给柜台由其代为下单。
阮富强介绍说，如果从高点算起，不少越南投资者的亏损高达80%，甚至高达90%。特别是去年指数上升到1100点时，有一批新投资者来开户，他们基本上都是退休老人、小摊小贩、家庭主妇之类，而在最高点接棒，受损显而易见。
在胡志明市土生土长的导游谢先生就是这样一个典型。他以前对股市根本不懂，看到前年股市涨疯了，也投了相当于人民币10万元的资金进去，而现在只剩下3万多了。
阮富强认为，股市跌到现在，也许正是比较好的投资机会。也就在昨日，越南股市结束了4月29日以来的连续下跌行情，在370点左右企稳，有关人士认为，这有可能表明该指数在今年下跌约60%后终于暂时获得了支撑。
“我们一直认为，情况没有那么悲观。”阮富强直截了当地指出，唯一需要担心的是，政府在控制通胀上出手过慢，其较高的利率也给中小银行和企业造成了很大的压力，会使得经济发展面临很多新问题。
而阮富强手下的业务员梁氏垂梅则对经济情况更为乐观，她有些激动地说，“我觉得越南的经济危机其实是某些国外组织写出来的，他们一年前还把我们的经济写得阳光一片，一年之后又写得漆黑一团，其实就我们自身的感觉来说，没有什么很大的变化，政府对于通胀的控制措施应该很得力。”
她的话得到了一部分越南市民的认可，他们觉得，高达25%的通胀似乎仅仅是一个高高在纸面上的数字。
骑着摩托的陈方说，他并没有过多地感受到通胀的压力，一年前92标号汽油一公升是1.1万盾（1元人民币可换2600越南盾），而近期是1.45万盾，他的摩托还能开得起。陈方把记者带到了胡志明市最大的自由百货市场——安东市场，这里集饮食、服装、金银首饰、海鲜销售等于一身，各类物品琳琅满目。金财档位的老板娘张金玉指着档位上的腰果、茶叶、咖啡等各类物品说，一年来这些东西并没有涨价。旁边几位越南客户也正在与老板侃着价，并不急着购买。记者见到，在整个安东市场，生意最好的显然属于黄金档铺，但人也并不多，其中皇燕档口的小姑娘说，现在24K纯金只比一年前涨了30%。
然而，尽管像陈方、梁氏垂梅这样的越南市民认为通胀并不值得忧虑，但关心越南证券市场的投资人士却把通胀水平减缓视为股市见底的最重要标志。
根据西贡证券5月中旬的统计，胡志明及河内两个市场中，净资产收益率超过10%、PE低于10倍的股票比比皆是，据记者粗略统计，两市绝大部分股票PE在15倍以下，净资产收益率高于10%的股票超过总数的一半。虽然如此之低，但高通胀显然让海外投资者不会马上进场，“现在虽然跌了很多，但我还要等一下，等越南的通胀水平降到20%以下才考虑进场。”一位海外投资者接受记者电话采访时表示。这对于越南来说，也许是今年下半年需要想尽一切招数才能达到的目标。
对于越南股市前景，阮富强等绝大多数人则保持了相当的自信，“大机会还没有来，越南现在上市的只是传统企业，真正核心的国家级企业还没有上市。”曾在台湾地区留过学的阮富强，对于中国股市也很有研究，他认为目前的越南股市正像早期的中国A股，上市公司行业代表性并不强，真正有实力的大型国企或是一些行业龙头并未上市。目前，越南最大的一家银行正在筹划IPO，随着这些龙头企业的陆续民营化，将有可能成为吸引资金重新入市的一个契机。
如今在美国究竟谁歧视谁？
第十九大案:如今在美国究竟谁歧视谁？——加州大学董事会诉巴基案(1978)
作者:任东来
西风吹，摇滚擂，如今在美国究竟谁歧视谁？
可能有人会说：这个问题难道还值得一提吗？自然是白人歧视黑人和其他少数民族。可是，很多美国白人认为，如果依照美国政府颁布和推行的“肯定性行动”（ＡｆｆｉｒｍａｔｉｖｅＡｃｔｉｏｎ）政策，如今在美国社会中遭受种族歧视之害的实际上是白人。这个涉及到“逆向歧视”（Ｒｅｖｅｒｓｅ Ｄｉｓｃｒｉｍｉｎａｔｉｏｎ）的复杂问题，正是曾轰动美国朝野的加利福尼亚州大学董事会诉贝基一案（ＲｅｇｅｎｔｓｏｆＵｎｉｖｅｒｓｉｔｙｏｆＣａｌｉｆｏｒｎｉａ ｖ.Ｂａｋｋｅ，１９７８）的缘起。
一、屡试不中的白人高材生
艾伦·贝基（ＡｌｌａｎＢａｋｋｅ）１９４１年生于美国佛罗里达州，其祖辈是来自北欧挪威的移民，父亲在邮局当差，母亲是小学教师。贝基从小勤奋好学，成绩出类拔萃，曾进入过全美中学生荣誉奖学金竞赛的决赛。１９５９年他考入明尼苏达大学，主修机械工程。大学期间，他的平均积分成绩（ＧＰＡ）为３.５１。
大学毕业后，贝基投笔从戎，入美国海军陆战队服役，参加了越南战争。在炮火连天的战场上，他沉着机敏、作战勇敢，为此在四年的军旅生涯中连升数级，晋升为上尉军官。海军陆战队是越战期间美军伤亡率最高的军种，贝基因所在部队也不例外。面对战友死伤的痛苦，艾伦·贝基初步萌发了当一名医生的志向。
１９６７年退役后，贝基在美国宇航局（ＮＡＳＡ）设在加州斯坦福大学附近的一个高级研究中心当了一名工程师。在中心期间，由宇航局资助，贝基考入斯坦福大学继续深造，获得机械工程硕士学位。然而，随着年龄的增长，贝基逐渐意识到，自己今生的最大愿望是成为一名救死扶伤的医生。于是，在工作之余他苦读医学院预科课程，并着手复习准备医学院入学考试（ＭＣＡＴ）。
谁都知道，美国的医生和律师不是那么好当的。首先，著名医学院和法学院的学费极为昂贵。而且，因学生毕业后收入较高，所以医学院和法学院基本上不提供奖学金。其次，著名医学院和法学院都有极低的录取率和白热化的竞争，考生的淘汰率和竞争的残酷性，在某种程度上超过了中国大陆的高考。以加州大学戴维斯分校医学院为例，该院１９７３年度只录取１００名学生，但申请人总数却高达２４６４人。
可是，贝基却恰好选中了加州大学戴维斯分校医学院作为重点报考院校之一，其原因，可用加州居民评价本州大学的俏皮话来解释：“如果你小子成绩好，你爹趁钱，念斯坦福大学；如果你小子成绩好，你爹没钱，念加州大学；如果你小子成绩糟，你爹趁钱，念南加州大学；如果你小子成绩糟，你爹没钱，念社区大学。”这其中的秘诀是，由加州大学董事会管理的柏克利、洛杉矶、圣地亚哥、戴维斯等大学分校虽然名列全美著名学府之榜，但与哈佛、耶鲁、普林斯顿、斯坦福等私立名校不同，加州大学所属分校全都是公立大学。因公立大学有联邦、州政府的资助和补贴，所以学费比那些私立名牌大学要便宜得多。另外，像贝基这样已在加州居住两年以上、依法交纳州税的居民，还会享受到本州学生大幅度减免学费的特殊待遇。
以优秀成绩结束医学院预科课程后，贝基在医学院入学考试中再传捷报。在科学知识部份，他的正确率为９７％；在语言能力部份，他的正确率为９６％；在数学部份，他的正确率为９４％。１９７２年底，踌躇满志的贝基向加州大学戴维斯分校医学院正式提出了１９７３年度入学申请。没想到，加州大学却给志在必得的艾伦·贝基吃了闭门羹。
照常理，以贝基的ＧＰＡ和ＭＣＡＴ成绩、斯坦福大学硕士学历以及综合素质，他应当是一个很有竞争力的申请人。贝基起初以为，自己名落孙山的原因可能是因年龄已超过了３０岁。但是，贝基后来却从戴维斯分校学生事务办公室打探出了一个令他大吃一惊的内幕。原来，在医学院当年１００名的录取名额中，有１６个特别名额专门分配给了黑人等少数民族学生。更令人吃惊的是，在被录取的１６名少数民族学生中，绝大多数人的ＧＰＡ和ＭＣＡＴ成绩远远不如自己。
贝基得知设置录取定额和不同的录取标准的内幕之后非常恼火，他奋笔疾书，给戴维斯分校录取办公室写了一封颇有政策水平的抱怨信。信中写道：“为了满足未来医疗健康事业的要求，医学界需要最有能力和最有献身精神的人才。我意识到，设置少数族裔录取定额是为了补偿以往种族歧视的恶果，但是，这种照顾少数民族的措施实际上又开创了新的种族偏见。这不是一个公正的解决办法。”
一通抱怨之后，１９７３年底贝基向加州大学戴维斯分校医学院提出了１９７４年度的入学申请。然而，贝基最后得到的回复仍然是一剂不予录取的苦药。
该做的全都做了，却死活进不了医学院，原因竟然是肤色不够黑！贝基从小在宣扬“白人优越”的社会中长大，这辈子还是第一次碰到这种“颠倒黑白”的怪事。中国人遇到冤屈不平之事可能会想到揍那个狗娘养的，美国人遇到冤屈不平之事第一个念头就是诉那个狗娘养的。艾伦·贝基当然也不例外，他一张状纸把加州大学告到了地方法院，控告加州大学搞逆向种族歧视，违反了民权法和美国宪法第１４修正案关于对公民平等法律保护的条款。
１９７５年，地方法院对贝基案做出一项对双方各打５０大板的判决：法官虽然判决加州大学设立的录取定额制度违法，但并未判决戴维斯分校医学院应当录取刺儿头贝基。结果控辩双方都不满意，继续向加州最高法院上诉。
１９７６年，加州最高法院判加州大学败诉。加州大学董事会当然不会服气，遂聘请曾在水们事件调查案中出任特别检察官的哈佛大学教授考克斯（ＡｒｃｈｉｂａｌｄＣｏｘ）为律师，于１９７８年把官司打到了联邦最高法院。
二、左右为难的最高法院
在一向标榜机会均等、公平竞争的美国社会，加州大学戴维斯分校医学院为何会为少数族裔申请人保留１６个特别录取名额呢？说起来，这个特殊的照顾措施实际上与美国政府颁布和推行的“肯定性行动”政策直接有关。
“肯定性行动”这个名词最早源自肯尼迪总统１９６１年签署的总统第１０９２５号行政命令。这个行政命令要求政府合同承包商采取肯定性行动，为少数族裔提供更多的工作机会，不得有种族、信仰、肤色、祖籍的歧视。约翰逊总统执政期间，联邦政府和国会陆续颁布了一系列包含范围更为广泛的“肯定性行动”法案，又称为平等权益法案。简而言之，“肯定性行动”政策实际上是一项在１９６４年《民权法》基础上发展起来的平等权益措施和法案，目的是帮助在美国历史上长期受到歧视的少数民族和妇女更快地改变在政治、经济、教育和社会等方面的劣势地位。具体地说，就是在升学、就业、晋升、颁发奖学金以及接受政府贷款和分配政府合同时，在竞争能力和资格基本相同或相近的情况下，黑人、印地安人、拉美裔和亚裔以及妇女有被优先录取、录用、晋升或优先得到贷款和政府合同的权利。
１９６９年，保守的共和党总统尼克松入主白宫，但他在推动“肯定性行动”政策方面的新措施却令人刮目相看。后来曾在里根政府担任国务卿要职的舒尔茨当年被尼克松总统任命为劳工部长，此公在劳工部长任内开创了后来引起极大争议的硬性定额制度。根据联邦劳工部的规定，公立大学在招生时必须招收一定比例的少数民族和女性学生，政府部门必须雇佣一定比例的少数民族和女性职员，一定比例的政府商务或工程合同应当优先给予少数民族或女性投标人。此外，凡是接受联邦政府资助以及所有与政府签订商务或工程合同的私营企业或私立大学，都必须提交一份“肯定性行动”计划，说明该企业或大学现有少数族裔雇员数量以及打算在多长时间内使少数民族雇员达到一定比例，否则资助和合同免谈。从７０年代中期起，“肯定性行动”政策的照顾范围又逐渐扩大到残疾人和退伍军人。
在民权运动声势浩大的６０年代，“肯定性行动”政策得到了全美大多数高等院校的积极响应。美国大学校园历来是自由化和激进化的大本营，而加州大学在６０年代反越战、争平权的学生运动中是全美高等院校中闹得最凶的大学之一。在此背景下，戴维斯分校为了纠正种族歧视造成的危害和以往对少数族裔的不公正待遇，增加医学院学生的多元性，为少数族裔树立刻苦学习、奋斗成材的榜样，特别设立了优惠和照顾少数族裔申请人的录取定额制度，结果引发了贝基诉讼案。
加州大学诉贝基一案实际上给美国最高法院出了一个极为棘手的大难题。原因很简单，这个事关联邦政府“肯定性行动”政策是否违宪的重大诉讼案并不是一个单纯的法律问题，而是一个高度复杂的政治问题。种族矛盾历来是美国政治中的定时炸弹，稍不留神就会在社会中心爆炸，引发空前严重的社会动乱。在中国社会，重大司法问题通常集中地表现为政治问题，但在美国社会，诚如法国政治学家托克维尔所言，任何政治问题最终都会演变成司法问题。美国社会中这种政治问题司法化的特殊国情，让美国最高法院大法官们伤透了脑筋。
在美国宪政史上，曾有过最高法院试图用法律手段解决政治问题结果却引发政治灾难和社会动乱的前例，其中最著名的例子就是南北战争前的的斯科特诉桑弗特一案（Ｓｃｏｔｔｖ.Ｓａｎｄｆｏｒｄ，１８５７）。当时，最高法院做出了偏向南方奴隶制的裁决，判决黑奴不是美国公民，并使国会已通过的旨在限制奴隶制扩张的“密苏里妥协”法案因违宪而被取消。尽管从单纯法律的角度看最高法院对斯科特案的判决无可厚非，但若从政治角度看，这一判决激化了本来已尖锐对立的南北争执，堵塞了以和平手段解决南方奴隶制问题的道路，坚定了南方各州依照宪法惯例捍卫奴隶制的决心，使北方和林肯总统处于“违法乱纪”的被动地位，对南北战争的爆发起到了推波助澜的恶劣作用，使美国陷入了一场无法避免的南北大战。斯科特案一向被美国学者认为是最高法院历史上最糟糕的判例。前车之鉴，使美国最高法院在审理这类“政治案”时，不得不小心翼翼，如临深渊，如履薄冰。
在贝基案之前，一位名叫马科·德夫尼斯（ＭａｒｃｏＤｅｆｕｎｉｓ）的白人学生早在１９７１年就已向“肯定性行动”政策发难。这位白人学生的法学院入学考试（ＬＳＡＴ）成绩比已被华盛顿大学法学院录取的大多数少数族裔申请人高得多，但却连续两年未被录取。一气之下，他便向地方法院控告华盛顿大学。地方法院于１９７１年判决华盛顿大学败诉，德夫尼斯遂如愿地进入法学院学习。但华盛顿大学不服判决，继续上诉，于１９７４年初把官司打到了最高法院。可是，出乎人们意料之外的是，１９７４年２月，最高法院以德夫尼斯当年５月就将从法学院毕业，审理这种“问题已过时”的案子（ＭｏｏｔＣａｓｅ）毫无法律意义为由，回避对德夫尼斯案（Ｄｅｆｕｎｉｓｖ.Ｏｄｅｇａａｒｄ，１９７４）做出司法裁决。其实，最高法院是找了个借口故意躲避这种令人头疼的政治难题，使支持和反对“肯定性行动”政策的两派人士大为失望。
可是，躲得了初一躲不了十五，几年后贝基案又打上门来，硬逼着左右为难的最高法院给个明确说法。美国朝野上下拭目以待，且看最高法院将如何对贝基案进行裁决。
１９７８年６月，在美国朝野众目睽睽之下，最高法院以５比４一票之差对贝基案做出了一个在美国宪政史上非常罕见的双重判决（ＤｏｕｂｌｅＤｅｃｉｓｉｏｎ）。由鲍威尔（ＬｅｗｉｓＰｏｗｅｌｌ）大法官主持宣读的判决书包括两个部份：第一部份判决加州大学设立的录取定额制度违法，加州大学医学院必须录取艾伦·贝基；第二部份判决加州大学有权实行一些使学生来源和校园学术环境多元化的特殊政策，在录取新生时可以把种族作为一个因素来考虑，但不能把种族作为惟一因素。
这样，最高法院一方面判决加州大学依照“肯定性行动”政策设立的录取定额制度违法，一方面又规定可以将种族作为考虑升学申请的一个因素，实际上又反过来支持了“肯定性行动”政策。这个极为圆滑的双重判决，使坚决支持和激烈反对“肯定性行动”政策的两派人士如坠云雾、无所是从。最高法院的判决虽然是法律决定，但对政治后果的慎重考虑显然对个别大法官的判决产生了相当重要的影响。
作者:任东来
西风吹，摇滚擂，如今在美国究竟谁歧视谁？
可能有人会说：这个问题难道还值得一提吗？自然是白人歧视黑人和其他少数民族。可是，很多美国白人认为，如果依照美国政府颁布和推行的“肯定性行动”（ＡｆｆｉｒｍａｔｉｖｅＡｃｔｉｏｎ）政策，如今在美国社会中遭受种族歧视之害的实际上是白人。这个涉及到“逆向歧视”（Ｒｅｖｅｒｓｅ Ｄｉｓｃｒｉｍｉｎａｔｉｏｎ）的复杂问题，正是曾轰动美国朝野的加利福尼亚州大学董事会诉贝基一案（ＲｅｇｅｎｔｓｏｆＵｎｉｖｅｒｓｉｔｙｏｆＣａｌｉｆｏｒｎｉａ ｖ.Ｂａｋｋｅ，１９７８）的缘起。
一、屡试不中的白人高材生
艾伦·贝基（ＡｌｌａｎＢａｋｋｅ）１９４１年生于美国佛罗里达州，其祖辈是来自北欧挪威的移民，父亲在邮局当差，母亲是小学教师。贝基从小勤奋好学，成绩出类拔萃，曾进入过全美中学生荣誉奖学金竞赛的决赛。１９５９年他考入明尼苏达大学，主修机械工程。大学期间，他的平均积分成绩（ＧＰＡ）为３.５１。
大学毕业后，贝基投笔从戎，入美国海军陆战队服役，参加了越南战争。在炮火连天的战场上，他沉着机敏、作战勇敢，为此在四年的军旅生涯中连升数级，晋升为上尉军官。海军陆战队是越战期间美军伤亡率最高的军种，贝基因所在部队也不例外。面对战友死伤的痛苦，艾伦·贝基初步萌发了当一名医生的志向。
１９６７年退役后，贝基在美国宇航局（ＮＡＳＡ）设在加州斯坦福大学附近的一个高级研究中心当了一名工程师。在中心期间，由宇航局资助，贝基考入斯坦福大学继续深造，获得机械工程硕士学位。然而，随着年龄的增长，贝基逐渐意识到，自己今生的最大愿望是成为一名救死扶伤的医生。于是，在工作之余他苦读医学院预科课程，并着手复习准备医学院入学考试（ＭＣＡＴ）。
谁都知道，美国的医生和律师不是那么好当的。首先，著名医学院和法学院的学费极为昂贵。而且，因学生毕业后收入较高，所以医学院和法学院基本上不提供奖学金。其次，著名医学院和法学院都有极低的录取率和白热化的竞争，考生的淘汰率和竞争的残酷性，在某种程度上超过了中国大陆的高考。以加州大学戴维斯分校医学院为例，该院１９７３年度只录取１００名学生，但申请人总数却高达２４６４人。
可是，贝基却恰好选中了加州大学戴维斯分校医学院作为重点报考院校之一，其原因，可用加州居民评价本州大学的俏皮话来解释：“如果你小子成绩好，你爹趁钱，念斯坦福大学；如果你小子成绩好，你爹没钱，念加州大学；如果你小子成绩糟，你爹趁钱，念南加州大学；如果你小子成绩糟，你爹没钱，念社区大学。”这其中的秘诀是，由加州大学董事会管理的柏克利、洛杉矶、圣地亚哥、戴维斯等大学分校虽然名列全美著名学府之榜，但与哈佛、耶鲁、普林斯顿、斯坦福等私立名校不同，加州大学所属分校全都是公立大学。因公立大学有联邦、州政府的资助和补贴，所以学费比那些私立名牌大学要便宜得多。另外，像贝基这样已在加州居住两年以上、依法交纳州税的居民，还会享受到本州学生大幅度减免学费的特殊待遇。
以优秀成绩结束医学院预科课程后，贝基在医学院入学考试中再传捷报。在科学知识部份，他的正确率为９７％；在语言能力部份，他的正确率为９６％；在数学部份，他的正确率为９４％。１９７２年底，踌躇满志的贝基向加州大学戴维斯分校医学院正式提出了１９７３年度入学申请。没想到，加州大学却给志在必得的艾伦·贝基吃了闭门羹。
照常理，以贝基的ＧＰＡ和ＭＣＡＴ成绩、斯坦福大学硕士学历以及综合素质，他应当是一个很有竞争力的申请人。贝基起初以为，自己名落孙山的原因可能是因年龄已超过了３０岁。但是，贝基后来却从戴维斯分校学生事务办公室打探出了一个令他大吃一惊的内幕。原来，在医学院当年１００名的录取名额中，有１６个特别名额专门分配给了黑人等少数民族学生。更令人吃惊的是，在被录取的１６名少数民族学生中，绝大多数人的ＧＰＡ和ＭＣＡＴ成绩远远不如自己。
贝基得知设置录取定额和不同的录取标准的内幕之后非常恼火，他奋笔疾书，给戴维斯分校录取办公室写了一封颇有政策水平的抱怨信。信中写道：“为了满足未来医疗健康事业的要求，医学界需要最有能力和最有献身精神的人才。我意识到，设置少数族裔录取定额是为了补偿以往种族歧视的恶果，但是，这种照顾少数民族的措施实际上又开创了新的种族偏见。这不是一个公正的解决办法。”
一通抱怨之后，１９７３年底贝基向加州大学戴维斯分校医学院提出了１９７４年度的入学申请。然而，贝基最后得到的回复仍然是一剂不予录取的苦药。
该做的全都做了，却死活进不了医学院，原因竟然是肤色不够黑！贝基从小在宣扬“白人优越”的社会中长大，这辈子还是第一次碰到这种“颠倒黑白”的怪事。中国人遇到冤屈不平之事可能会想到揍那个狗娘养的，美国人遇到冤屈不平之事第一个念头就是诉那个狗娘养的。艾伦·贝基当然也不例外，他一张状纸把加州大学告到了地方法院，控告加州大学搞逆向种族歧视，违反了民权法和美国宪法第１４修正案关于对公民平等法律保护的条款。
１９７５年，地方法院对贝基案做出一项对双方各打５０大板的判决：法官虽然判决加州大学设立的录取定额制度违法，但并未判决戴维斯分校医学院应当录取刺儿头贝基。结果控辩双方都不满意，继续向加州最高法院上诉。
１９７６年，加州最高法院判加州大学败诉。加州大学董事会当然不会服气，遂聘请曾在水们事件调查案中出任特别检察官的哈佛大学教授考克斯（ＡｒｃｈｉｂａｌｄＣｏｘ）为律师，于１９７８年把官司打到了联邦最高法院。
二、左右为难的最高法院
在一向标榜机会均等、公平竞争的美国社会，加州大学戴维斯分校医学院为何会为少数族裔申请人保留１６个特别录取名额呢？说起来，这个特殊的照顾措施实际上与美国政府颁布和推行的“肯定性行动”政策直接有关。
“肯定性行动”这个名词最早源自肯尼迪总统１９６１年签署的总统第１０９２５号行政命令。这个行政命令要求政府合同承包商采取肯定性行动，为少数族裔提供更多的工作机会，不得有种族、信仰、肤色、祖籍的歧视。约翰逊总统执政期间，联邦政府和国会陆续颁布了一系列包含范围更为广泛的“肯定性行动”法案，又称为平等权益法案。简而言之，“肯定性行动”政策实际上是一项在１９６４年《民权法》基础上发展起来的平等权益措施和法案，目的是帮助在美国历史上长期受到歧视的少数民族和妇女更快地改变在政治、经济、教育和社会等方面的劣势地位。具体地说，就是在升学、就业、晋升、颁发奖学金以及接受政府贷款和分配政府合同时，在竞争能力和资格基本相同或相近的情况下，黑人、印地安人、拉美裔和亚裔以及妇女有被优先录取、录用、晋升或优先得到贷款和政府合同的权利。
１９６９年，保守的共和党总统尼克松入主白宫，但他在推动“肯定性行动”政策方面的新措施却令人刮目相看。后来曾在里根政府担任国务卿要职的舒尔茨当年被尼克松总统任命为劳工部长，此公在劳工部长任内开创了后来引起极大争议的硬性定额制度。根据联邦劳工部的规定，公立大学在招生时必须招收一定比例的少数民族和女性学生，政府部门必须雇佣一定比例的少数民族和女性职员，一定比例的政府商务或工程合同应当优先给予少数民族或女性投标人。此外，凡是接受联邦政府资助以及所有与政府签订商务或工程合同的私营企业或私立大学，都必须提交一份“肯定性行动”计划，说明该企业或大学现有少数族裔雇员数量以及打算在多长时间内使少数民族雇员达到一定比例，否则资助和合同免谈。从７０年代中期起，“肯定性行动”政策的照顾范围又逐渐扩大到残疾人和退伍军人。
在民权运动声势浩大的６０年代，“肯定性行动”政策得到了全美大多数高等院校的积极响应。美国大学校园历来是自由化和激进化的大本营，而加州大学在６０年代反越战、争平权的学生运动中是全美高等院校中闹得最凶的大学之一。在此背景下，戴维斯分校为了纠正种族歧视造成的危害和以往对少数族裔的不公正待遇，增加医学院学生的多元性，为少数族裔树立刻苦学习、奋斗成材的榜样，特别设立了优惠和照顾少数族裔申请人的录取定额制度，结果引发了贝基诉讼案。
加州大学诉贝基一案实际上给美国最高法院出了一个极为棘手的大难题。原因很简单，这个事关联邦政府“肯定性行动”政策是否违宪的重大诉讼案并不是一个单纯的法律问题，而是一个高度复杂的政治问题。种族矛盾历来是美国政治中的定时炸弹，稍不留神就会在社会中心爆炸，引发空前严重的社会动乱。在中国社会，重大司法问题通常集中地表现为政治问题，但在美国社会，诚如法国政治学家托克维尔所言，任何政治问题最终都会演变成司法问题。美国社会中这种政治问题司法化的特殊国情，让美国最高法院大法官们伤透了脑筋。
在美国宪政史上，曾有过最高法院试图用法律手段解决政治问题结果却引发政治灾难和社会动乱的前例，其中最著名的例子就是南北战争前的的斯科特诉桑弗特一案（Ｓｃｏｔｔｖ.Ｓａｎｄｆｏｒｄ，１８５７）。当时，最高法院做出了偏向南方奴隶制的裁决，判决黑奴不是美国公民，并使国会已通过的旨在限制奴隶制扩张的“密苏里妥协”法案因违宪而被取消。尽管从单纯法律的角度看最高法院对斯科特案的判决无可厚非，但若从政治角度看，这一判决激化了本来已尖锐对立的南北争执，堵塞了以和平手段解决南方奴隶制问题的道路，坚定了南方各州依照宪法惯例捍卫奴隶制的决心，使北方和林肯总统处于“违法乱纪”的被动地位，对南北战争的爆发起到了推波助澜的恶劣作用，使美国陷入了一场无法避免的南北大战。斯科特案一向被美国学者认为是最高法院历史上最糟糕的判例。前车之鉴，使美国最高法院在审理这类“政治案”时，不得不小心翼翼，如临深渊，如履薄冰。
在贝基案之前，一位名叫马科·德夫尼斯（ＭａｒｃｏＤｅｆｕｎｉｓ）的白人学生早在１９７１年就已向“肯定性行动”政策发难。这位白人学生的法学院入学考试（ＬＳＡＴ）成绩比已被华盛顿大学法学院录取的大多数少数族裔申请人高得多，但却连续两年未被录取。一气之下，他便向地方法院控告华盛顿大学。地方法院于１９７１年判决华盛顿大学败诉，德夫尼斯遂如愿地进入法学院学习。但华盛顿大学不服判决，继续上诉，于１９７４年初把官司打到了最高法院。可是，出乎人们意料之外的是，１９７４年２月，最高法院以德夫尼斯当年５月就将从法学院毕业，审理这种“问题已过时”的案子（ＭｏｏｔＣａｓｅ）毫无法律意义为由，回避对德夫尼斯案（Ｄｅｆｕｎｉｓｖ.Ｏｄｅｇａａｒｄ，１９７４）做出司法裁决。其实，最高法院是找了个借口故意躲避这种令人头疼的政治难题，使支持和反对“肯定性行动”政策的两派人士大为失望。
可是，躲得了初一躲不了十五，几年后贝基案又打上门来，硬逼着左右为难的最高法院给个明确说法。美国朝野上下拭目以待，且看最高法院将如何对贝基案进行裁决。
１９７８年６月，在美国朝野众目睽睽之下，最高法院以５比４一票之差对贝基案做出了一个在美国宪政史上非常罕见的双重判决（ＤｏｕｂｌｅＤｅｃｉｓｉｏｎ）。由鲍威尔（ＬｅｗｉｓＰｏｗｅｌｌ）大法官主持宣读的判决书包括两个部份：第一部份判决加州大学设立的录取定额制度违法，加州大学医学院必须录取艾伦·贝基；第二部份判决加州大学有权实行一些使学生来源和校园学术环境多元化的特殊政策，在录取新生时可以把种族作为一个因素来考虑，但不能把种族作为惟一因素。
这样，最高法院一方面判决加州大学依照“肯定性行动”政策设立的录取定额制度违法，一方面又规定可以将种族作为考虑升学申请的一个因素，实际上又反过来支持了“肯定性行动”政策。这个极为圆滑的双重判决，使坚决支持和激烈反对“肯定性行动”政策的两派人士如坠云雾、无所是从。最高法院的判决虽然是法律决定，但对政治后果的慎重考虑显然对个别大法官的判决产生了相当重要的影响。
Moving Forward in Iraq
| NOVEMBER 22, 2005
Senator Barack Obama
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago, IL
Good afternoon.
It is a privilege to give this speech at the Council on Foreign Relations here in Chicago.
A few months ago, I had the opportunity to visit Walter Reed Army Medical Center. While I was there, I met a young man whose legs had been blown off from mortar fire and who had sustained severe nerve damage in his arms and hands. He was sewing as a means of regaining his small motor skills, and as his wife looked on, they talked about their efforts to piece their lives back together. They talked about the wonderful way their young daughter had embraced her father and told him she loved him despite his disfigurement.
I also met a young man who had lost a leg and an arm and who now had a breathing tube in his throat. He was working with two of the therapists in a mock-up kitchen to cook hamburgers on his own.
We went down to the physical therapy area where I talked to a 19-year-old former track star who had lost both his legs and was working out on one of the weight machines. And I spoke to a sergeant from Iowa who had lost one of his legs but was working vigorously to get accustomed to his prosthetic leg so he could return to Iraq as soon as he could. I then went up to the wards to visit with other injured veterans - to take pictures, talk about basketball, and to say thank you.
Listening to the stories of these young men and women, most of them in their early twenties, I had to ask myself how I would be feeling if it were my son, my nephew, or my sister lying there. I asked myself how I would be feeling if it were me struggling to learn how to walk again? Would I feel bitter? Would I feel hopeless?
I don't know. None of us can answer that question fully until we find ourselves in that situation. What I do know is that the extraordinary men and women that I met seemed uninterested in rage or self-pity. They were proud of their service. They were hopeful for their future. They displayed the kind of grit and optimism and resourcefulness that represents the very best of America.
They remind us, in case we need reminding, that there is no more profound decision that we can make than the decision to send this nation's youth to war, and that we have a moral obligation not only to send them for good reasons, but to constantly examine, based on the best information and judgment available, in what manner, and for what purpose, and for how long we keep them in harm's way.
Today, nearly 160,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are risking their lives in the Middle East. They are operating in some of the most dangerous and difficult circumstances imaginable. Well over 2,000 men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice - given their full measure of devotion. Thousands more have returned with wounds like those that I saw at Walter Reed.
These men and women are willing to lay down their lives to protect us. When they were told there was danger that needed to be confronted they said, "I will go. I will leave my family and my friends and the life I knew and I will fight." And they went. And they're fighting still.
And so as the war rages on and the insurgency festers - as another father weeps over a flag-draped casket and another wife feeds her husband the dinner he can't fix for himself - it is our duty to ask ourselves hard questions. What do we want to accomplish now that we are in Iraq, and what is possible to accomplish? What kind of actions can we take to ensure not only a safe and stable Iraq, but that will also preserve our capacity to rebuild Afghanistan, isolate and apprehend terrorist cells, preserve our long-term military readiness, and devote the resources needed to shore up our homeland security? What are the costs and benefits of our actions moving forward? What urgency are we willing to show to bring our troops home safely? What kind of answers are we willing to demand from those in charge of the war?
In other words -- What kind of debate are we willing to have?
Last week, the White House showed exactly what kind of debate it wants on future of Iraq - none.
We watched the shameful attempt to paint John Murtha - a Marine Corp recipient of two-purple hearts and a Bronze Star - into a coward of questionable patriotism. We saw the Administration tell people of both parties - people who asked legitimate questions about the intelligence that led us to war and the Administration's plan for Iraq - that they should keep quiet, end the complaining, and stop rewriting history.
This political war - a war of talking points and Sunday news shows and spin - is not one I'm interested in joining. It's a divisive approach that only pushes us further from what the American people actually want - a pragmatic solution to the real war we're facing in Iraq.
I do want to make the following observations, though. First, I am part of that post Baby Boom generation that was too young to fight in Vietnam, not called to fight in Desert Storm, too old for the current conflict. For those like me who - for whatever reason - have never seen battle, whether they be in the Administration or in Congress, let me suggest that they put the words "coward" and "unpatriotic" out of their vocabulary - at least when it comes to veterans like John Murtha who have put their lives on the line for this country. I noticed that the President recognized this bit of wisdom yesterday. I hope others do to.
Second - the Administration is correct to say that we have real enemies, that our battle against radical Islamist terrorism will not be altered overnight, that stability in the Middle East must be part of our strategy to defeat terrorism, that military power is a key part of our national security, that our strategy cannot be poll driven. The Administration is also correct when it says that many overestimated Saddam's biological and chemical capacity, and that some of its decisions in going to war were prompted by real errors in the intelligence community's estimates.
However, I think what is also true is that the Administration launched the Iraq war without giving either Congress or the American people the full story. This is not a partisan claim - you don't have to take my word for it. All you need to do is to match up the Administration's statements during the run-up to the war with the now declassified intelligence estimates that they had in their possession at the time. Match them up and you will conclude that at the very least, the Administration shaded, exaggerated and selectively used the intelligence available in order to make the case for invasion.
The President told the American people about Iraqi attempts to acquire yellow cake during the State of the Union. The Vice-President made statements on national television expressing certainty about Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. Secretary Rice used the words "mushroom cloud" over and over again.
We know now that even at the time these unequivocal statements were made, intelligence assessments existed that contradicted these claims. Analysis from the CIA and State Department was summarily dismissed when it did not help the Administration make the case for war.
I say all this not to score cheap political points. I say this because war is a serious business. It requires enormous sacrifice, in blood and treasure, from the American people. The American people have already lost confidence in the credibility of our leadership, not just on the question of Iraq, but across the board. According to a recent Pew survey, 42% of Americans agree with the statement that the U.S. should "mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own" - a significant increase since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We risk a further increase in isolationist sentiment unless both the Administration and Congress can restore the American people's confidence that our foreign policy is driven by facts and reason, rather than hopes and ideology. And we cannot afford isolationism - not only because our work with respect to stabilizing Iraq is not complete, but because our missteps in Iraq have distracted us from the larger threat of terrorism that we face, a threat that we can only meet by working internationally, in cooperation with other countries.
Now, given the enormous stakes in Iraq, I believe that those of us who are involved in shaping our national security policies should do what we believe is right, not merely what is politically expedient. I strongly opposed this war before it began, though many disagreed with me at that time. Today, as Americans grow increasingly impatient with our presence in Iraq, voices I respect are calling for a rapid withdrawal of our troops, regardless of events on the ground.
But I believe that, having waged a war that has unleashed daily carnage and uncertainty in Iraq, we have to manage our exit in a responsible way - with the hope of leaving a stable foundation for the future, but at the very least taking care not to plunge the country into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis. I say this not only because we owe it to the Iraqi people, but because the Administration's actions in Iraq have created a self-fulfilling prophecy - a volatile hotbed of terrorism that has already begun to spill over into countries like Jordan, and that could embroil the region, and this country, in even greater international conflict.
In sum, we have to focus, methodically and without partisanship, on those steps that will: one, stabilize Iraq, avoid all out civil war, and give the factions within Iraq the space they need to forge a political settlement; two, contain and ultimately extinquish the insurgency in Iraq; and three, bring our troops safely home.
Last week's re-politicization of the war makes this kind of focus extremely difficult. In true Washington fashion, the Administration has narrowed an entire debate about war into two camps: "cut-and-run" or "stay the course." If you offer any criticism or even mention that we should take a second look at our strategy and change our approach, you're branded cut-and-run. If you're ready to blindly trust the Administration no matter what they do, you're willing to stay the course.
A variation on this is the notion that anything short of an open-ended commitment to maintain our current troop strength in Iraq is the equivalent of issuing a "timetable" that will, according to the Administration, undermine our troops and strengthen the insurgency.
.
This simplistic framework not only misstates the position of thoughtful critics on both sides of the aisle - from Republican Senator Chuck Hagel to Democrat Russ Feingold. It completely misses where the American people are right now.
Every American wants to see a peaceful and stable Iraq. No American wants to leave behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide. But no American wants a war without end - a war where our goals and strategies drift aimlessly regardless of the cost in lives or dollars spent, and where we end up with arbitrary, poll-driven troop reductions by the Administration - the worst of all possible outcomes.
It has been two years and seven months since the fall of Baghdad and any honest assessment would conclude that the Administration's strategy has not worked. The civilian efforts to rebuild Iraq, establish a secure environment, and broker a stable political framework have, thus far, come up short.
The Administration owes the American people a reality-based assessment of the situation in Iraq today. For the past two years, they've measured progress in the number of insurgents killed, roads built, or voters registered. But these benchmarks are not true measures of fundamental security and stability in Iraq.
When the Administration now talks about "condition-based" withdrawal, we need to know precisely what those conditions are.
This is why the amendment offered by Senator Levin and the one that passed from Senator Warner are so important. What the Administration and some in the press labeled as a "timetable" for withdrawal was in fact a commonsense statement that: one, 2006 should be the year that the Iraqi government decreases its dependency on the United States; two, that the various Iraqi factions must arrive at a fair political accommodation to defeat the insurgency; and three, the Administration must make available to Congress critical information on reality-based benchmarks that will help us succeed in Iraq.
We need to know whether the Iraqis are making the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement essential for defeating the insurgency.
We need to know how many Iraqi security forces and police and the level of skill they will require to permit them to take the lead in counter-insurgency operations, the defense of Iraq's territory, and maintaining law and order throughout the country.
We need to get accurate information regarding how many Iraqi troops are currently prepared for the transition of security responsibilities, and a realistic assessment of the U.S. resources and time it will take to make them more prepared.
And, we need to know the Administration's strategy to restore basic services, strengthen the capacities of ministries throughout the country, and enlist local, regional, and international actors in finding solutions to political, economic, and security problems.
Straight answers to critical questions - for the most part, that is what both the Levin Amendment and the Warner Amendment call for. Members of both parties and the American people have now made clear that it is not enough to for the President to simply say "we know best" and "stay the course."
As I have said before, there are no magic bullets for a good outcome in Iraq. I am not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, or the Director of National Intelligence. I have neither the expertise nor the inclination to micro-manage war from Washington.
Nevertheless, given the best information I have, and in an effort to offer constructive ideas, I would suggest several broad elements that should be included in any discussion of where we go from here. I should add that some of these ideas have been put forward in greater detail by other senators and foreign policy experts - I claim no pride of authorship, but rather offer my best assessment of the steps we need to take to maximize the prospects for success.
First and foremost, after the December 15 elections and during the course of next year, we need to focus our attention on how reduce the U.S. military footprint in Iraq. Notice that I say "reduce," and not "fully withdraw."
This course of action will help to focus our efforts on a more effective counter-insurgency strategy and take steam out of the insurgency.
On this point, I am in basic agreement with our top military commander in Iraq. In testimony before Congress earlier this year, General Casey stated that a key goal of the military was to "reduce our presence in Iraq, taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency: that of the coalition forces as an occupying force."
This is not and should not be a partisan issue. It is a view shared by Senator Chuck Hagel, a decorated Vietnam veteran, and someone with whom I am proud to serve on the Foreign Relations Committee.
I believe that U.S. forces are still a part of the solution in Iraq. The strategic goals should be to allow for a limited drawdown of U.S. troops, coupled with a shift to a more effective counter-insurgency strategy that puts the Iraqi security forces in the lead and intensifies our efforts to train Iraqi forces.
At the same time, sufficient numbers of U.S. troops should be left in place to prevent Iraq from exploding into civil war, ethnic cleansing, and a haven for terrorism.
We must find the right balance - offering enough security to serve as a buffer and carry out a targeted, effective counter-insurgency strategy, but not so much of a presence that we serve as an aggravation. It is this balance that will be critical to finding our way forward.
Second, we need not a time-table, in the sense of a precise date for U.S. troop pull-outs, but a time-frame for such a phased withdrawal. More specifically, we need to be very clear about key issues, such as bases and the level of troops in Iraq. We need to say that there will be no bases in Iraq a decade from now and the United States armed forces cannot stand-up and support an Iraqi government in perpetuity - pushing the Iraqis to take ownership over the situation and placing pressure on various factions to reach the broad based political settlement that is so essential to defeating the insurgency.
I agree with Senator Warner that the message should be "we really mean business, Iraqis, get on with it." Without a time-frame, this message will not be sent.
With the Shiites increasingly in control of the government, the U.S. is viewed as the military force that is keeping the Shiites in power, picking sides in the conflict, driving a wedge between the factions, and keeping the Sunnis out of the government.
Wrong as these perceptions may be, they are one of the key elements unifying the insurgency and serving as its best recruiting slogan.
We need to immediately recognize and address this problem.
On October 25, Ambassador Khailizad stated that he believes that the United States is on the right track to start significant reductions of U.S. military forces in the coming year. Earlier in the year, when I pressed Ambassador Khalizad on this during his confirmation hearing to be more specific about a time-frame for withdrawal, he said that there would not be a U.S. presence in Iraq a decade from now. That's at a start - but I think we need to be clearer than somewhere between one and ten years.
Third, we need to start thinking about what an Iraqi government will look like in the near term.
The post-election period will be critically important in working with the Shia and Kurdish leaders to help address Sunni concerns and to take steps to bring them into the government.
In testimony before Congress, Secretary Rice stated that while she believed it was possible to create a multi-ethnic, democratic Iraq under a unified national government, it was also possible that, in the near term, Iraq may look more like a loose federation and less like a tightly-knit, multi-ethnic society. According to the deal struck in the writing of the Constitution, the structure of the national government may still be altered by discussion among the three major factions. If it is the Administration's most realistic assessment that the Iraqi government will take the form of a loose confederation, then we need to be thinking about how we should calibrate our policies to reflect this reality. We cannot, and should not, foist our own vision of democracy on the Iraqis, and then expect our troops to hold together such a vision militarily.
Fourth, we have to do a much better job on reconstruction in Iraq.
The Iraqi people wonder why the United States has been unable to restore basic services - sewage, power, infrastructure - to significant portions of Iraq. This has caused a loss of faith among the Iraqi people in our efforts to rebuild that nation and help it recover from decades of brutal tyranny.
The Administration tells us there can not be reconstruction without security, but many Iraqis make the opposite argument. They say Iraq will never be secure until there is reconstruction and citizens see that a better future awaits them.
The Administration also tells us that they are making progress, but can not publicize the specific successes out of security concerns.
If we are unable to point out the progress, how are Iraqis - especially ones we are trying to persuade to claim a bigger stake in the future of their country - ever to know that the Americans efforts are helping to make their lives better? How does this approach help to quell the insurgency?
We need to break this cycle. We have to get more Iraqis involved with the reconstruction efforts. After all, it is the Iraqis who best know their country and have the greatest stake in restoring basic services.
We need to work with the best and brightest Iraqis, inside and outside of government to come up with a plan to get the power back on in Baghdad and help to restore the faith of the Iraqi people in our important mission in Iraq.
Fifth, we have to launch a major diplomatic effort to get the international community, especially key neighboring states and Arab nations, more involved in Iraq. If one looks at the Balkans - our most recent attempt to rebuild war torn nations - the international community, from the European Union to NATO to the United Nations, were all deeply involved. These organizations, driven largely by European countries in the region, provided legitimacy, helped with burden-sharing, and were an essential part of our exit strategy. Ten years later, conditions are not perfect, but the blood-shed has been stopped, and the region is no longer destabilizing the European Continent. And so a part of any strategy in Iraq must more deeply integrate Iraq's neighbors, international organizations, and regional powers around the world.
Finally, it is critical for this Administration, and Congress, to recognize that despite the enormous stakes the United States now has in seeing Iraq succeed, we cannot let this mission distract us from the larger front of international terrorism that remains to be addressed. Already we are getting reports that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. Our progress in improving our intelligence capabilities - particularly human intelligence - has lagged. Iraq has absorbed resources that could have gone into critical homeland security measures, or in improved coordination with our global allies and partners. At the outset of this war, I challenged the Administration's assertion that deposing Saddam Hussein was the central measure in our war on terrorism. And although I believe we must stabilize Iraq, I continue to believe that the Administration's tendency to equate the military defeat of the Iraqi insurgency with the defeat of international terrorism is dangerously short-sighted.
Long the before the war in Iraq, international terrorism posed a grave security threat to the United States. Well over two years after the start of the Iraq war, these threats to our way of life remain every bit as serious. Some have argued that these threats have grown. The Administration has to be capable of finding a solution in Iraq and strengthening our efforts to combat international terrorism.
In the end, Iraq is not about one person's legacy, a political campaign, or rigid adherence to an ideology.
What is happening in Iraq is about the security of the United States. It is about our men and women in uniform. It is about the future of the Middle East. It is about the world in which our children will live.
Responsible voices from all parts of the political spectrum are coming forth to say this in increasing numbers.
Colin Powell had the courage to call his presentation to the United Nations on Iraq a "blot" on his distinguished record. And recently John Edwards said he made a mistake in voting to go to war in Iraq, and accepted responsibility for this decision.
It is no coincidence that both Mr. Edwards and Mr. Powell no longer serve the government in Washington. Those of us in Washington are falling behind the debate that is taking place across America on Iraq. We are failing to provide leadership on this issue.
Iraq was a major issue in last year's election.
But that election is now over.
We need to stop the campaign.
The President could take the politics out of Iraq once and for all if he would simply go on television and say to the American people "Yes, we made mistakes. Yes, there are things I would have done differently. But now that we're here, I am willing to work with both Republicans and Democrats to find the most responsible way out."
Nearly four decades ago, John F. Kennedy took responsibility for the Bay of Pigs Invasion. He admitted that mistakes had been made. He didn't spend a good deal of time publicly blaming the previous Administration, or the other party, or his critics. And through these decisive actions, he earned the respect of the American people and the world - respect that allowed his diplomacy to be trusted a few years later during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Americans everywhere are crying out for this kind of leadership today. They want to find pragmatic solutions to the difficult and complicated situation in Iraq. They want to move forward on of the greatest foreign policy challenges that this nation has faced in a generation. And they want to get it right for every American son and daughter who's been willing to put their lives on the line to defend the country they love. It's time for us in Washington to offer the rest of the country this leadership. Thank you.
Senator Barack Obama
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
Chicago, IL
Good afternoon.
It is a privilege to give this speech at the Council on Foreign Relations here in Chicago.
A few months ago, I had the opportunity to visit Walter Reed Army Medical Center. While I was there, I met a young man whose legs had been blown off from mortar fire and who had sustained severe nerve damage in his arms and hands. He was sewing as a means of regaining his small motor skills, and as his wife looked on, they talked about their efforts to piece their lives back together. They talked about the wonderful way their young daughter had embraced her father and told him she loved him despite his disfigurement.
I also met a young man who had lost a leg and an arm and who now had a breathing tube in his throat. He was working with two of the therapists in a mock-up kitchen to cook hamburgers on his own.
We went down to the physical therapy area where I talked to a 19-year-old former track star who had lost both his legs and was working out on one of the weight machines. And I spoke to a sergeant from Iowa who had lost one of his legs but was working vigorously to get accustomed to his prosthetic leg so he could return to Iraq as soon as he could. I then went up to the wards to visit with other injured veterans - to take pictures, talk about basketball, and to say thank you.
Listening to the stories of these young men and women, most of them in their early twenties, I had to ask myself how I would be feeling if it were my son, my nephew, or my sister lying there. I asked myself how I would be feeling if it were me struggling to learn how to walk again? Would I feel bitter? Would I feel hopeless?
I don't know. None of us can answer that question fully until we find ourselves in that situation. What I do know is that the extraordinary men and women that I met seemed uninterested in rage or self-pity. They were proud of their service. They were hopeful for their future. They displayed the kind of grit and optimism and resourcefulness that represents the very best of America.
They remind us, in case we need reminding, that there is no more profound decision that we can make than the decision to send this nation's youth to war, and that we have a moral obligation not only to send them for good reasons, but to constantly examine, based on the best information and judgment available, in what manner, and for what purpose, and for how long we keep them in harm's way.
Today, nearly 160,000 American soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are risking their lives in the Middle East. They are operating in some of the most dangerous and difficult circumstances imaginable. Well over 2,000 men and women have made the ultimate sacrifice - given their full measure of devotion. Thousands more have returned with wounds like those that I saw at Walter Reed.
These men and women are willing to lay down their lives to protect us. When they were told there was danger that needed to be confronted they said, "I will go. I will leave my family and my friends and the life I knew and I will fight." And they went. And they're fighting still.
And so as the war rages on and the insurgency festers - as another father weeps over a flag-draped casket and another wife feeds her husband the dinner he can't fix for himself - it is our duty to ask ourselves hard questions. What do we want to accomplish now that we are in Iraq, and what is possible to accomplish? What kind of actions can we take to ensure not only a safe and stable Iraq, but that will also preserve our capacity to rebuild Afghanistan, isolate and apprehend terrorist cells, preserve our long-term military readiness, and devote the resources needed to shore up our homeland security? What are the costs and benefits of our actions moving forward? What urgency are we willing to show to bring our troops home safely? What kind of answers are we willing to demand from those in charge of the war?
In other words -- What kind of debate are we willing to have?
Last week, the White House showed exactly what kind of debate it wants on future of Iraq - none.
We watched the shameful attempt to paint John Murtha - a Marine Corp recipient of two-purple hearts and a Bronze Star - into a coward of questionable patriotism. We saw the Administration tell people of both parties - people who asked legitimate questions about the intelligence that led us to war and the Administration's plan for Iraq - that they should keep quiet, end the complaining, and stop rewriting history.
This political war - a war of talking points and Sunday news shows and spin - is not one I'm interested in joining. It's a divisive approach that only pushes us further from what the American people actually want - a pragmatic solution to the real war we're facing in Iraq.
I do want to make the following observations, though. First, I am part of that post Baby Boom generation that was too young to fight in Vietnam, not called to fight in Desert Storm, too old for the current conflict. For those like me who - for whatever reason - have never seen battle, whether they be in the Administration or in Congress, let me suggest that they put the words "coward" and "unpatriotic" out of their vocabulary - at least when it comes to veterans like John Murtha who have put their lives on the line for this country. I noticed that the President recognized this bit of wisdom yesterday. I hope others do to.
Second - the Administration is correct to say that we have real enemies, that our battle against radical Islamist terrorism will not be altered overnight, that stability in the Middle East must be part of our strategy to defeat terrorism, that military power is a key part of our national security, that our strategy cannot be poll driven. The Administration is also correct when it says that many overestimated Saddam's biological and chemical capacity, and that some of its decisions in going to war were prompted by real errors in the intelligence community's estimates.
However, I think what is also true is that the Administration launched the Iraq war without giving either Congress or the American people the full story. This is not a partisan claim - you don't have to take my word for it. All you need to do is to match up the Administration's statements during the run-up to the war with the now declassified intelligence estimates that they had in their possession at the time. Match them up and you will conclude that at the very least, the Administration shaded, exaggerated and selectively used the intelligence available in order to make the case for invasion.
The President told the American people about Iraqi attempts to acquire yellow cake during the State of the Union. The Vice-President made statements on national television expressing certainty about Iraq's nuclear weapons programs. Secretary Rice used the words "mushroom cloud" over and over again.
We know now that even at the time these unequivocal statements were made, intelligence assessments existed that contradicted these claims. Analysis from the CIA and State Department was summarily dismissed when it did not help the Administration make the case for war.
I say all this not to score cheap political points. I say this because war is a serious business. It requires enormous sacrifice, in blood and treasure, from the American people. The American people have already lost confidence in the credibility of our leadership, not just on the question of Iraq, but across the board. According to a recent Pew survey, 42% of Americans agree with the statement that the U.S. should "mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own" - a significant increase since the immediate aftermath of 9/11. We risk a further increase in isolationist sentiment unless both the Administration and Congress can restore the American people's confidence that our foreign policy is driven by facts and reason, rather than hopes and ideology. And we cannot afford isolationism - not only because our work with respect to stabilizing Iraq is not complete, but because our missteps in Iraq have distracted us from the larger threat of terrorism that we face, a threat that we can only meet by working internationally, in cooperation with other countries.
Now, given the enormous stakes in Iraq, I believe that those of us who are involved in shaping our national security policies should do what we believe is right, not merely what is politically expedient. I strongly opposed this war before it began, though many disagreed with me at that time. Today, as Americans grow increasingly impatient with our presence in Iraq, voices I respect are calling for a rapid withdrawal of our troops, regardless of events on the ground.
But I believe that, having waged a war that has unleashed daily carnage and uncertainty in Iraq, we have to manage our exit in a responsible way - with the hope of leaving a stable foundation for the future, but at the very least taking care not to plunge the country into an even deeper and, perhaps, irreparable crisis. I say this not only because we owe it to the Iraqi people, but because the Administration's actions in Iraq have created a self-fulfilling prophecy - a volatile hotbed of terrorism that has already begun to spill over into countries like Jordan, and that could embroil the region, and this country, in even greater international conflict.
In sum, we have to focus, methodically and without partisanship, on those steps that will: one, stabilize Iraq, avoid all out civil war, and give the factions within Iraq the space they need to forge a political settlement; two, contain and ultimately extinquish the insurgency in Iraq; and three, bring our troops safely home.
Last week's re-politicization of the war makes this kind of focus extremely difficult. In true Washington fashion, the Administration has narrowed an entire debate about war into two camps: "cut-and-run" or "stay the course." If you offer any criticism or even mention that we should take a second look at our strategy and change our approach, you're branded cut-and-run. If you're ready to blindly trust the Administration no matter what they do, you're willing to stay the course.
A variation on this is the notion that anything short of an open-ended commitment to maintain our current troop strength in Iraq is the equivalent of issuing a "timetable" that will, according to the Administration, undermine our troops and strengthen the insurgency.
.
This simplistic framework not only misstates the position of thoughtful critics on both sides of the aisle - from Republican Senator Chuck Hagel to Democrat Russ Feingold. It completely misses where the American people are right now.
Every American wants to see a peaceful and stable Iraq. No American wants to leave behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide. But no American wants a war without end - a war where our goals and strategies drift aimlessly regardless of the cost in lives or dollars spent, and where we end up with arbitrary, poll-driven troop reductions by the Administration - the worst of all possible outcomes.
It has been two years and seven months since the fall of Baghdad and any honest assessment would conclude that the Administration's strategy has not worked. The civilian efforts to rebuild Iraq, establish a secure environment, and broker a stable political framework have, thus far, come up short.
The Administration owes the American people a reality-based assessment of the situation in Iraq today. For the past two years, they've measured progress in the number of insurgents killed, roads built, or voters registered. But these benchmarks are not true measures of fundamental security and stability in Iraq.
When the Administration now talks about "condition-based" withdrawal, we need to know precisely what those conditions are.
This is why the amendment offered by Senator Levin and the one that passed from Senator Warner are so important. What the Administration and some in the press labeled as a "timetable" for withdrawal was in fact a commonsense statement that: one, 2006 should be the year that the Iraqi government decreases its dependency on the United States; two, that the various Iraqi factions must arrive at a fair political accommodation to defeat the insurgency; and three, the Administration must make available to Congress critical information on reality-based benchmarks that will help us succeed in Iraq.
We need to know whether the Iraqis are making the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement essential for defeating the insurgency.
We need to know how many Iraqi security forces and police and the level of skill they will require to permit them to take the lead in counter-insurgency operations, the defense of Iraq's territory, and maintaining law and order throughout the country.
We need to get accurate information regarding how many Iraqi troops are currently prepared for the transition of security responsibilities, and a realistic assessment of the U.S. resources and time it will take to make them more prepared.
And, we need to know the Administration's strategy to restore basic services, strengthen the capacities of ministries throughout the country, and enlist local, regional, and international actors in finding solutions to political, economic, and security problems.
Straight answers to critical questions - for the most part, that is what both the Levin Amendment and the Warner Amendment call for. Members of both parties and the American people have now made clear that it is not enough to for the President to simply say "we know best" and "stay the course."
As I have said before, there are no magic bullets for a good outcome in Iraq. I am not the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, or the Director of National Intelligence. I have neither the expertise nor the inclination to micro-manage war from Washington.
Nevertheless, given the best information I have, and in an effort to offer constructive ideas, I would suggest several broad elements that should be included in any discussion of where we go from here. I should add that some of these ideas have been put forward in greater detail by other senators and foreign policy experts - I claim no pride of authorship, but rather offer my best assessment of the steps we need to take to maximize the prospects for success.
First and foremost, after the December 15 elections and during the course of next year, we need to focus our attention on how reduce the U.S. military footprint in Iraq. Notice that I say "reduce," and not "fully withdraw."
This course of action will help to focus our efforts on a more effective counter-insurgency strategy and take steam out of the insurgency.
On this point, I am in basic agreement with our top military commander in Iraq. In testimony before Congress earlier this year, General Casey stated that a key goal of the military was to "reduce our presence in Iraq, taking away one of the elements that fuels the insurgency: that of the coalition forces as an occupying force."
This is not and should not be a partisan issue. It is a view shared by Senator Chuck Hagel, a decorated Vietnam veteran, and someone with whom I am proud to serve on the Foreign Relations Committee.
I believe that U.S. forces are still a part of the solution in Iraq. The strategic goals should be to allow for a limited drawdown of U.S. troops, coupled with a shift to a more effective counter-insurgency strategy that puts the Iraqi security forces in the lead and intensifies our efforts to train Iraqi forces.
At the same time, sufficient numbers of U.S. troops should be left in place to prevent Iraq from exploding into civil war, ethnic cleansing, and a haven for terrorism.
We must find the right balance - offering enough security to serve as a buffer and carry out a targeted, effective counter-insurgency strategy, but not so much of a presence that we serve as an aggravation. It is this balance that will be critical to finding our way forward.
Second, we need not a time-table, in the sense of a precise date for U.S. troop pull-outs, but a time-frame for such a phased withdrawal. More specifically, we need to be very clear about key issues, such as bases and the level of troops in Iraq. We need to say that there will be no bases in Iraq a decade from now and the United States armed forces cannot stand-up and support an Iraqi government in perpetuity - pushing the Iraqis to take ownership over the situation and placing pressure on various factions to reach the broad based political settlement that is so essential to defeating the insurgency.
I agree with Senator Warner that the message should be "we really mean business, Iraqis, get on with it." Without a time-frame, this message will not be sent.
With the Shiites increasingly in control of the government, the U.S. is viewed as the military force that is keeping the Shiites in power, picking sides in the conflict, driving a wedge between the factions, and keeping the Sunnis out of the government.
Wrong as these perceptions may be, they are one of the key elements unifying the insurgency and serving as its best recruiting slogan.
We need to immediately recognize and address this problem.
On October 25, Ambassador Khailizad stated that he believes that the United States is on the right track to start significant reductions of U.S. military forces in the coming year. Earlier in the year, when I pressed Ambassador Khalizad on this during his confirmation hearing to be more specific about a time-frame for withdrawal, he said that there would not be a U.S. presence in Iraq a decade from now. That's at a start - but I think we need to be clearer than somewhere between one and ten years.
Third, we need to start thinking about what an Iraqi government will look like in the near term.
The post-election period will be critically important in working with the Shia and Kurdish leaders to help address Sunni concerns and to take steps to bring them into the government.
In testimony before Congress, Secretary Rice stated that while she believed it was possible to create a multi-ethnic, democratic Iraq under a unified national government, it was also possible that, in the near term, Iraq may look more like a loose federation and less like a tightly-knit, multi-ethnic society. According to the deal struck in the writing of the Constitution, the structure of the national government may still be altered by discussion among the three major factions. If it is the Administration's most realistic assessment that the Iraqi government will take the form of a loose confederation, then we need to be thinking about how we should calibrate our policies to reflect this reality. We cannot, and should not, foist our own vision of democracy on the Iraqis, and then expect our troops to hold together such a vision militarily.
Fourth, we have to do a much better job on reconstruction in Iraq.
The Iraqi people wonder why the United States has been unable to restore basic services - sewage, power, infrastructure - to significant portions of Iraq. This has caused a loss of faith among the Iraqi people in our efforts to rebuild that nation and help it recover from decades of brutal tyranny.
The Administration tells us there can not be reconstruction without security, but many Iraqis make the opposite argument. They say Iraq will never be secure until there is reconstruction and citizens see that a better future awaits them.
The Administration also tells us that they are making progress, but can not publicize the specific successes out of security concerns.
If we are unable to point out the progress, how are Iraqis - especially ones we are trying to persuade to claim a bigger stake in the future of their country - ever to know that the Americans efforts are helping to make their lives better? How does this approach help to quell the insurgency?
We need to break this cycle. We have to get more Iraqis involved with the reconstruction efforts. After all, it is the Iraqis who best know their country and have the greatest stake in restoring basic services.
We need to work with the best and brightest Iraqis, inside and outside of government to come up with a plan to get the power back on in Baghdad and help to restore the faith of the Iraqi people in our important mission in Iraq.
Fifth, we have to launch a major diplomatic effort to get the international community, especially key neighboring states and Arab nations, more involved in Iraq. If one looks at the Balkans - our most recent attempt to rebuild war torn nations - the international community, from the European Union to NATO to the United Nations, were all deeply involved. These organizations, driven largely by European countries in the region, provided legitimacy, helped with burden-sharing, and were an essential part of our exit strategy. Ten years later, conditions are not perfect, but the blood-shed has been stopped, and the region is no longer destabilizing the European Continent. And so a part of any strategy in Iraq must more deeply integrate Iraq's neighbors, international organizations, and regional powers around the world.
Finally, it is critical for this Administration, and Congress, to recognize that despite the enormous stakes the United States now has in seeing Iraq succeed, we cannot let this mission distract us from the larger front of international terrorism that remains to be addressed. Already we are getting reports that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating. Our progress in improving our intelligence capabilities - particularly human intelligence - has lagged. Iraq has absorbed resources that could have gone into critical homeland security measures, or in improved coordination with our global allies and partners. At the outset of this war, I challenged the Administration's assertion that deposing Saddam Hussein was the central measure in our war on terrorism. And although I believe we must stabilize Iraq, I continue to believe that the Administration's tendency to equate the military defeat of the Iraqi insurgency with the defeat of international terrorism is dangerously short-sighted.
Long the before the war in Iraq, international terrorism posed a grave security threat to the United States. Well over two years after the start of the Iraq war, these threats to our way of life remain every bit as serious. Some have argued that these threats have grown. The Administration has to be capable of finding a solution in Iraq and strengthening our efforts to combat international terrorism.
In the end, Iraq is not about one person's legacy, a political campaign, or rigid adherence to an ideology.
What is happening in Iraq is about the security of the United States. It is about our men and women in uniform. It is about the future of the Middle East. It is about the world in which our children will live.
Responsible voices from all parts of the political spectrum are coming forth to say this in increasing numbers.
Colin Powell had the courage to call his presentation to the United Nations on Iraq a "blot" on his distinguished record. And recently John Edwards said he made a mistake in voting to go to war in Iraq, and accepted responsibility for this decision.
It is no coincidence that both Mr. Edwards and Mr. Powell no longer serve the government in Washington. Those of us in Washington are falling behind the debate that is taking place across America on Iraq. We are failing to provide leadership on this issue.
Iraq was a major issue in last year's election.
But that election is now over.
We need to stop the campaign.
The President could take the politics out of Iraq once and for all if he would simply go on television and say to the American people "Yes, we made mistakes. Yes, there are things I would have done differently. But now that we're here, I am willing to work with both Republicans and Democrats to find the most responsible way out."
Nearly four decades ago, John F. Kennedy took responsibility for the Bay of Pigs Invasion. He admitted that mistakes had been made. He didn't spend a good deal of time publicly blaming the previous Administration, or the other party, or his critics. And through these decisive actions, he earned the respect of the American people and the world - respect that allowed his diplomacy to be trusted a few years later during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Americans everywhere are crying out for this kind of leadership today. They want to find pragmatic solutions to the difficult and complicated situation in Iraq. They want to move forward on of the greatest foreign policy challenges that this nation has faced in a generation. And they want to get it right for every American son and daughter who's been willing to put their lives on the line to defend the country they love. It's time for us in Washington to offer the rest of the country this leadership. Thank you.
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